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TREATY RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A STUDY
OF COMPLIANCE *
L-ux T. LFY, t
By their fruits ye shall know them.
Matthew 7:20
I.

INTRODUCTION

The attitudes of the People's Republic of China (PRC) towards
international law have been the object of several inquiries in recent
years.' Valuable as these studies are in providing information on the
background and theories of Chinese international law, no systematic
analysis of China's actual conduct in relation to treaty obligations has
been undertaken.' Yet the importance of treaty practice and corn* This paper was written under the auspices of the United Nations Association
of the United States of America for the use of its China Panel. The views expressed
herein, however, do not necessarily reflect those of the UNA-USA or the Panel, and
responsibility for the content of the paper is entirely the author's. The author cannot
express adequately his appreciation and gratitude to officials in different countries
who have given their assistance and cooperation.
t B.A. 1944, St John's University (Shanghai); M.A. 1947, Columbia University;
Ph.D. 1954, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B. 1963, University of
Michigan. Director, New York Office, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University. Lecturer in Law, New York University School of Law.
1See, e.g., Dicks, Chinese Attitudes to International Law (Royal Institute of
International Affairs, Working Group on China and the World, undated); Beaut6,
Le Rt6publique Populaire de Chine et le Droit International, 68 REv. GEN. DE Daorr
INT'L. PUBLIC 350 (1964); Chiu, Communist Chinds Attitude Toward International
Law, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 245 (1966) ; Edwards, The Attitude of the People's Republic
of China Toward InternationalLaw and the United Nations, in 17 PAPERS ON CHINA
(Harvard University East Asian Research Center, Dec. 1963); Leng, Communist
China's Position on Nuclear Arms Control, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 101 (1966) ; Steiner,
Communist China in the World Community, INT'L CONCILIATION, No. 533, at 387
(May 1961).
2A few statements of a denunciatory nature have appeared from time to time.
The Department of State, for example, in 1963 compiled a study on The Conduct
of Communist China for the use of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 88th
Congress, 1st Session. It accused the PRC of four violations of specific agreements:
two relating to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, one to the 1955 "agreement"
on the repatriation of Chinese and American civilians and one to the 1954 Sino-Indian
agreements concerning Tibet. Since the first three affect the United States-PRC
relations directly, they are examined in detail in the present study. See text accompanying notes 59-80 infra. Deterioration of Sino-Indian treaty relations over Tibet,
since it is an immediate outgrowth of the absence of a boundary treaty, will not be
discussed in this paper.
Many more studies, some systematic and analytical, have been undertaken on
Soviet compliance with treaty obligations. See, e.g., INTRNAL SECURIY SuBcoMM.
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 84TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT RE

RUSSIAN BRoaNn PROMISES (Comm. Print 1962); REPORT OF THE A.B.A. SPEciAL
COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST TAcrics, STRATEGIES, AND OaJEcivEs (1959) (this report
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pliance cannot be overemphasized.'
Assuming the existence of a
correlation between a country's past record of treaty compliance and
its future conduct, a study of past treaty practice could provide a basis
by which to predict and anticipate Chinese policy and activities in
regard to future treaties. Furthermore, China traditionally has regarded itself as the center of the universe and head of the Confucian
family of nations, whose existence long antedated the much younger
and essentially Western discipline of international law. It is understandable, therefore, that China might feel reluctant to be bound by
Western customary law, in the making of which it did not participate.
Treaties, on the other hand, as expressions of consent, remain the
4
logical source of international law for China.
This emphasis on treaty-centered international law is far from
discouraging, for relations between states are more and more governed
by treaties, and customary international law is increasingly becoming
crystallized into conventional international law.' Even the Charter
of the United Nations is itself a treaty, sui generis though it may be.
The impending codification of the law of treaties, planned for 1968has not been endorsed by the ABA); U.S. DEIT oF DEFENSE, SoVIEr TREATY ViOLATIONS: ALERT No. 5 (1962); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIoNs (printed for use of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 27, 1961)). See also Memorandum from the Department of State on Soviet Treaty Violations, Aug. 22, 1963
in Hearings on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 967-68 (1963) (listing agreements observed generally
by the Soviet Union).
The Defense Department study, supra, appears to reflect the general theme that
"Officials of the Soviet Union, from the 1917 Bolshevik revolution onward through
45 years of Communist rule, have established an undisputed reputation for breaking
their most solenn pledges." ALEr No. 5, supra at 2. It may be wondered to what
extent this finding of consistent treaty violations by the first and most powerful
Communist state has been assumed to be true with respect to all other Communist
states, including the PRC, and may have constituted the basic premises of U.S. policies
towards the Far East and Southeast Asia.
3 Speaking at the opening of the World Peace through Law Conference in Geneva,
Chief Justice Earl Warren urged the lawyers of the world to sponsor the negotiation
of "hundreds and perhaps thousands" of treaties to regulate all phases of international
relations. "Instead of matching each other soldier for soldier, plane for plane, bomb
for bomb and missile for missile," he called upon nations to compete with each other
"law for law, treaty for treaty." Treaty compliance in such a "law-full" world
would render war obsolete. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1967, at 11, col. 2.
4 For a Chinese view regarding treaties as the major source of international
law, see Wei Liang, On International Treaties Concluded Since World War II,
Kuo-cHi T'IAO-YfEH CHI (International Treaty Series), 1953-1955, at 660 (Peking,
1961). For Soviet views, see ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R., INTERATIONAL
LAW 12 (English transl. 1961); J. TRIsKA & I. Sussna, THE: THEORY, LAW, AND
POLICY OF Sovlnr TREATIES 9-31 (1962).
5 The following statistics may be of interest: A total of 579 treaties or international
agreements were registered with the United Nations Secretariat during the year ending
June. 15, 1967. The figure for the period of December 14, 1946-June 15, 1967, was
12,636. See Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization,
June 16, 1966-June 15, 1967, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/6701 (1967).
6
See Lee, International Law Commission Re-examined, 59 Ams. J. INT'L L. 545,
568 (1965).
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1969,' will further facilitate the conclusion and implementation of
treaties as well as the settlement of disputes arising therefrom.
A study of Chinese treaty relations at this time may serve another
important purpose. Hitherto, arguments for and against Peking's
representation at the United Nations have centered, rightly or wrongly,
on her ability and willingness to fulfill obligations arising under the
Charter of the United Nations. The absence of a systematic study of
Chinese treaty practice has left this essentially legal question to the
realm of emotional speculation. Since informed public opinion can
contribute significantly to intelligent foreign policy, it is time to subject
the question of Chinese treaty compliance to critical legal scrutiny.
II.

METHODOLOGY

An obvious limitation to the present study is the inability of the
author to travel to mainland China to consult its archives and interview
its officials. However, since the study is aimed at determining the
actual treaty compliance record of the PRC, judged by performance
observable by the outside world and particularly by its co-signatories,
the inaccessibility of mainland China has not posed an insuperable
barrier. A substantial portion of the research was conducted in Japan,
which has the finest collection of Chinese materials, both classical and
contemporary, outside China. In addition, Japan's proximity to
China and its relative intellectual freedom on the subject of China
facilitated the present research. It may be noted that Japan leads all
other countries in: (a) the number of visitors to China, (b) the
number of newsmen (nine) stationed in China, (c) the amount of
news published concerning China and (d) the volume of trade with
China. For these reasons, many countries have sent their China
experts to Tokyo as diplomats. These diplomats are less restrained
in discussing China than are their colleagues in the United States,
whose reluctance to talk is understandable in view of the known position
of the host country.
Government officials, including diplomats, generally are reluctant
to be quoted directly, especially in regard to subject matter as sensitive
as China. Almost all government officials insisted as a precondition
for granting interviews that the talks be held off-the-record. This
sensitivity extended to unpublished official documents, which were
made available to the author for background information, but could
not be cited directly without prior authorization. Such authorization
only could be obtained, if at all, through proper channels and after
interminable delays. The author, therefore, occasionally has been
7 See G.A. Res. 2166, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 95, U.N.

Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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compelled to follow the journalistic practice of referring to unnamed
"reliable sources," rather than suppressing valuable information and
avoiding discussion of vital issues. The choice between the two
alternatives involves a serious dilemma: whether one should desist
from examining an issue of great importance and publishing his findings because the materials involved are not generally accessible to the
public or because their sources cannot be revealed. It is the author's
view that one who possesses special information affecting public welfare
and security has an obligation to use it to public advantage, provided
adequate safeguards are adopted to minimize inaccuracy and bias.
In the course of this investigation, the author selected for interviews individuals who are or were in positions which have brought
them into close contact with the PRC.8 While substantial research was
undertaken in Toyo Bunko and the main Diet Library in Japan, the
search for primary source materials took the author to almost all Far
Eastern countries outside mainland China, and to the United Nations
Command in Seoul, the neutral nations' compound in Panmunjom and
the Ministries for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm and Helsinki.
Information thus collected was scrutinized with respect to possible
motivation, consistency with known facts and corroboration by independent sources. For example, in studying Chinese compliance with
economic assistance agreements, the author took cognizance of the
human tendency to praise the generosity of gift donors. Corroborative
evidence was required to show that a specific project was indeed completed according to agreement. Since detailed information on the
content of such agreements and on the condition of the completed
project was unavailable, the author has refrained from reaching any
conclusion concerning the PRC's compliance with aid agreements,
despite the unanimous opinion of diplomats interviewed on the subject
that the Chinese compliance record was excellent.
Another research problem concerned the selection of countries
and treaties for inclusion in the present study. Obviously, it would
not be feasible to cover all the treaties concluded by Peking since 1949.
In addition, there may well be treaties whose existence or breach has
escaped the author's notice. Subject to these limitations, the author
was guided in his selection by the importance of the subject matter,
the need for balanced representation and an intent to give priority to
China's treaties with her immediate neighbors.
8

Among these were 11 Ambassadors, 3 Deputy Chiefs of Missions, 6 Counsellors,
10 First and Second Secretaries, 5 Legal Advisers, 2 Directors of Intelligence and
Research, 2 Chiefs of Sections in the China Bureau of a Foreign Office, 1 General
Officer, 2 Colonels, and innumerable editors and reporters of newspapers and magazines interested in China. In addition, talks were held with responsible officials of
the Japan-China Fisheries Council, the
the United Nations in Japan and Korea,
Canadian Wheat Board and even a "friendly firm."
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Omitted from detailed study were those treaties couched in general
terms, such as the seventeen treaties of peace, friendship or nonaggression concluded between 1950 and 1965.' These treaties stress
the promotion of cultural and economic cooperation and the five
principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 10 These
general treaties also occasionally call for respect for the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations."
Specific obligations are usually
limited to settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiation and some bar
each party from entering into military alliances directed against
the other.
Similarly omitted from discussion by the terms of reference set
for this study are disputes which did not owe their origin to applicable
treaties, such as the Sino-Indian border disputes (which stemmed from
the absence of a boundary treaty), the various incidents involving
diplomatic immunities (which resulted from the fact that the PRC is
not a signatory to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 12) and the conflicts over Tibet (which, as a part of China,
cannot have treaty relations with it).'
While the importance of Peking's attitudes towards treaties concluded before 1949 cannot be denied, time is not yet ripe for such a
9 These treaties are published in CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-Ho-Kuo Yu-HAo
T'IAc-YijEH HUi-PiEN (1965) (Collection of Goodwill Treaties of the People's Republic of China) [hereinafter cited as PRC GOODwILL TREATrEs].
1oThe five principles were first incorporated in the Sino-Indian treaty of 1954
on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet. See text in 3
KUNG-Ho-xuo T'iAo-YOEH CI

1-4 (1954)

CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN

(Treaty Series of the People's Republic

of China) [hereinafter cited as PRC TREATY SERIEs]. Since then, China has included
these principles in many treaties, particularly goodwill treaties. See note 9 supra.
"lSee, e.g., 1960 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression Between
China and Afghanistan, PRC GOODWILL TREATIES 18; 1957 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation
Between China and Czechoslovakia, id. at 93.
12 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/13 (April 16, 1961), and Corr. 1 (September 12,
1961), reproduced in L. LE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 273-83
(1966).
I3 The legal relationship of Tibet to China dates from the 13th century when
Kublai Khan, a Mongol Emperor of China, donated the temporal authority to the
Dalai Lamas, and continued through the Manchu dynasty and the Republican era
to the 1951 Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, translated into
English in A. L. STRONG, TIBErAN INTERVIEWS 200-05 (1959). This has been a
subject of considerable interest and controversy. Space does not permit a detailed
study here except to refer readers to some of the more recent literature. See
INTERNATIONAL COMMIssION oF JURISTS, THE QUESTION op TIBET AND THE RULE
OF LA-,W (1959); A. LAMB, THE CHINA-INDIA BoRDER (1964); Alexandrowicz,
Comment on the Legal Position of Tibet, 5 INDIAN YEAR BOOK OF INT'L AFFAIRS
172-73 (1956) ; Green, Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian- Border Dispute, THE CHINA
Q., July-Sept. 1960, No. 3, at 43; Rubin, A Matter of Fact, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 586

(1965) ; Rubin, The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, 9 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 96 (1960) ;
Sharma, The India-ChinaBorder Dispute: An Indian Perspective, 59 AM. J. INT'L L.
16 (1965); Tieh-Tseng Li, The Legal Position of Tibet, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 394
(1956).

TREATY RELATIONS OF PRC

study. It may be noted that, unlike the Bolsheviks, who in 1917-1918
abrogated treaty obligations incurred by the Tsarist and Provisional
Governments because of the cataclysm of "social revolution," 4 "the
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall
examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang
and foreign governments, and recognize, or abrogate, or revise or
renew them according to their respective contents." '" Thus, although
such "unequal treaties" as the Sino-United States Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation of 1946 "1 have been repudiated, other
"unequal treaties," including boundary treaties, have not been unilaterally abrogated. Many countries still include their pre-1949 treaties
with China in their yearly publications of treaties in force. It is not
certain, however, whether these treaties are still recognized as valid
by the PRC. Rather than risk an outright repudiation by raising the
question, the countries involved have preferred to continue the present
uncertain state of affairs. On the whole, the view of en-min Jih-pao
may be taken to reflect the official policy of the PRC: "Pending future
negotiation, the status quo should be maintained." '
As to multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the
United Nations and signed by the Nationalist Government on Taiwan,
Peking's position is uneqivocal: "An international agreement made
without the participation and signature of China's representative will
have no binding force whatsoever on China." "8 Recent incidents involving diplomatic personnel of the British, Netherlands, Soviet and
French Embassies in Peking may reflect this position, since the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which safeguards diplomatic privileges and immunities, was signed by the Nationalist Government, but not by Peking."9
III.

CONCEPT OF TREATIES IN

TRADITIONAL CHINA

It is axiomatic that the present cannot be divorced from the past,
even in a society currently undergoing a "Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution." To understand present-day Chinese treaty practice, one
must first grasp the role of treaties in traditional China.
14J. TRisxiA

& R. SLUSSER, atpra note 4, at 142-45.

15 See Art. 55 of the Common Program adopted in September 1949 at the Chinese

People's Political Consultative Conference, translated into English in

FUNDAMExTAL

LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA 34-53 (A. Blaustein ed. 1962).

1663 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (1948). This treaty was not ratified until
November 30, 1948. By then, the civil war was being fought.
i7 Editorial of Jen-min jih-pao, March 8, 1963, at 2.
18 Statement by Chou En-lai on April 10, 1960, N.Y. Times, April 11, 1960, at 7,
col. 2. See also editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao, December 18, 1963, at 1.
19 See text accompanying notes 200-03 infra.
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The concept of foreign relations as dealings with foreign states
based on sovereign equality did not exist in traditional China. "Foreign
relations" existed only with tributary states or dependencies and involved only such matters as receiving and accommodating tributebearers, translating and transmitting their memorials to the Emperor,
supervising their business dealings with Chinese merchants and arranging imperial audiences, banquets and rewards. The name of the
organization in charge of such activities was itself revealing: Hui-t'ung
ssu-ku kuan (Residence for Envoys of the Four Tributary States);
China, the Middle Kingdom, the source of civilization and center of
the universe, could have no equals. The Confucian system of the
family, which set out the proper roles for the superior and the inferior,
the senior and the junior, also applied to the family of nations, with
China as its head and the smaller states on its periphery. Annam,
Burma, Korea, Siam and sometimes Japan paid homage in the form
Indeed, the highest ideal of a Chinese, impressed
of periodic tributes.
upon him from childhood, was to establish order for the entire world
through rectification of the mind, cultivation of the person, regulation
of the family and governance of the state." Confucius envisaged
ta-t'ung ("Universal Commonwealth") as the ultimate state of human
development.'
In such a universal state, international relations, strictly speaking,
did not exist. However, quasi-international relations came into existence during the Chou Dynasty (1122-256 B.C.), especially in the
Ch'un Ch'iu period (722-481 B.C.). The latter part of the Chou
Dynasty saw the erosion of the power of the House of Chou and the
ascendency of its retainers who ruled subordinate states. During the
Ch'un Ch'iu period, five such states (Ch'i, Chin, Ch'in, Ch'fi and Wu)
rose to the pinnacle of power, only to fall in their turn. Like the Holy
Roman Empire, the Middle Kingdom retained only its empty shell and
legal fiction; actual power resided in the dependent states, whose relationship was no longer based on the rank of the retainers who governed
them. In this setting, a horizontal, quasi-international law gradually
developed to replace the vertical feudal order. This process was
quickened as the Ch'un Ch'iu gave way to the Warring States period.
20

Thus, it was said: "Under the wide heaven, there is no land that is not the
Emperor's, and within the sea-boundaries of the land, there is none who is not a
subject of the Emperor." Boosc oF ODES, Hsiao-ya: Pei-shan, ch. II, English translation in I. C. Y. Hsu, CHINA's ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIoNs 6 (1960).
Korean records described relations with China as sadae (serving the senior), but
those2 1with Japan as kyorin (relations with a neighbor). Id. at 4.
CONFUcIus, TEE GREAT LEARNING ch. 1 (E. Pound transl. 1939).
22

The Confucian ideal of ta-e'ung states: "Where the 'right course' (ta-tao)

reigns, there everything in the world is common property (res publica)
is called ta-t'ung." Li-cr bk. 21: Li-yiin.

....

this
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It was the disorder and confusion of the Ch'un Ch'iu period that
moved Confucius to expound his li in his work Ch'un Ch'iu or The
variSpring and Autumn Annals. The concept of the Confucian li,
ously translated as "propriety," "ethics" or "moral rules of correct
conduct and good manners," ' dominated not only the family and
society, but also the quasi-international law, which extended the concepts of li to interstate relations.' While an exhaustive discussion of
the content of li cannot be attempted here, the following illustrations
of its interstate application may be given.
In one instance Confucius praised the Marquis of Ch'i, the
dominant leader of a league who had convened a congress of states
to conclude a new league in 651 B.C., for thus uniting the lords by
peaceful means instead of military force. The event was recorded in
Tso Chuan as follows: "They assembled at K'wei-ch'iu to renew the
league and to cultivate the good relations among the princes themselves; which was proper."'
In another instance, the Duke of Hsfiang and the Marquis of Ch'i
tried to reconcile a conflict between the states of Ch'i and T'an. The
people of Ch'fi were unwilling to be reconciled, whereupon the Duke
invaded Ch'ii and took the city of Hsiang. Tso Chuan condemned
the Duke's act as not being in accord with li: "States must be reconciled
by the rules of propriety, and not by disorder. To attack Ch'ii, without
regulating [the difference by those rules], was creating disorder. By
[sic] disorder to attempt to reconcile disorder, [it] left no room for
the [proper] regulation; and without such regulation, how could any
rule of propriety be carried out?" 6

The state of Tsin, in refusing a peace offer from the Earl of
Cheng, seized the Earl and put to death an emissary sent by the State
of Cheng. Tso Chuan condemned Tsin's act as contrary to the rule
that in time of hostility, any emissary must be allowed to move safely
between the parties."
Upon defeating Cheng, the powerful state of Tsin tried to impose
a harsh peace settlement. Cheng protested that peace terms should be
based on li and not imposed arbitrarily. Tsin conceded the propriety
of this claim, acknowledging that a coerced covenant of league would
2 See Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60 MICH.

L. Rxv. 439, 440 (1962) ; Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GoVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 28 (Amer. Council of Learned Societies ed.

1957).

24

See Iriye, The Principles of International Law in the Light of Confucian

Doctrine, lectures delivered at the Hague Academy of International Law, summer
1967, to be published in the 1967 issue of Recueil de Cours.
25 Bk. V, Duke Hsi, Yr. IX, in 5 CHINESE CLASSICS 154 (2d ed. J. Legge 1966).
26 Bk. VII, Duke Hsiiang, Yr. IV, in id. at 296.
27 Bk. VIII, Duke Ch'eng, Yr. IX, in id. at 371.
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be contrary to ii. Tso Chuan noted the statement from Chih Wu-tze
to Hsien-tze: "We indeed have not virtue, and it is not proper to force
men to covenant with us. Without propriety, how can we preside our
covenants? .... . If we are without virtue, other people will cast
us off, and not Cheng only; if we can rest and be harmonious, they
will come to us from a distance." Accordingly, Tsin agreed to a
revision of the terms and withdrew its forces."
Above all, 1i is concerned with sincerity (ch'eng) and trustworthiness (hsin), for which Western legal equivalents are "good faith" and
"Pacta sunt servanda." These concepts are extensions of the Confucian concept of the proper relationship between friend and friend.
Mencius said:
Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and subject, there should be righteousness;
between husband and wife, there should be respective duties;
between the elder and the younger there should be order;
between friends, there should be sincerity'
The dominance of 1i in the Chinese law of treaties continued to
manifest itself when China was forced to enter the modern family of
nations during the 19th century. Thus, to the Chinese of the mid-19th
century, the 1842 Sino-British Treaty of Nanking 0 was known as the
Wan-nien Ho-yiieh (the Peace Treaty of Ten Thousand Years) and
was supposedly unalterable and forever valid. The Tsungli Yamen
wrote in 1867: "Once an item enters into a treaty, every word of it
becomes ironclad." "1 Li Hung-chang was convinced that once a treaty
had been ratified, nothing further could be done about it. 2 Even a
monarch as xenophobic as Emperor Hsein-feng did not abrogate any
treaty unilaterally. The most he did was to encourage the obstructionist tactics of his Canton viceroy, Yeh Ming-ch'en, and the Canton
populace.With respect to Nationalist China, it is common knowledge that
it has maintained an excellent record of treaty compliance despite incessant difficulties at home. Indeed, it has justified its claim for
continued representation in the United Nations, in part, upon such
a record.
28 Bk. IX, Duke Hsiang, Yr. IX, in id. at 441.
29 Mencius, bk. III, pt I, ch. 4, § 8, in 2 CHINESE

251-52.

CLAssIcs, supra note 25, at

3030 BRmsii & FoRExGN STATE PAPERs 1841-1842, at 389.
31 Ch'ou-pan I-wu Shih-mo (The Complete Account of the Management of Bar-

barian Affairs), in Hsu, supra note 20, at 142.
32 Id.
33Id.
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IV. TREATY PRACTICE OF

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A. Boundary Treaties
The importance of territorial boundaries to a nation cannot be
overemphasized. Indeed, a defined territory is one of the prerequisites for statehood. In most major international issues, such as
aggression, self-determination, intervention, trade and colonization,
the element of territory looms large. There is nothing more likely to
appeal to a nation's ego and emotion than references to "sacred soil,"
"motherland" or "fatherland."
Historically ill-defined boundaries often lead to international disputes or even war. The Sino-Indian border war is a case in point.
A well-defined boundary, on the other hand, prevents not only border
incidents resulting from honest differences of opinion, but also removes
a convenient pretext for potential aggressors. It better suits the purposes of a potential aggressor to retain an unmarked or poorly defined
boundary, than to have a clear-cut one. Such being the case, it is of
interest to examine China's boundary policy with its neighbors.
In his statement of July 9, 1957, before the Chinese People's
Congress on the Sino-Burmese border question, Premier Chou En-lai
declared that it was the consistent policy of the Chinese Government
to settle all unresolved issues with other counteries by peaceful negotiation on the basis of justice and reasonableness.3" It is appropriate to
test this declared policy against the actual settlement of the SinoBurmese boundary issue.
Shortly after the Korean War, negotiation was initiated between China and Burma for the purpose of demarcating the boundary
between the two countries. After six years of negotiation and surveying, a boundary treaty was concluded on October 1, 1960,' 5 with an
exchange of notes on the same date, 6 supplemented by an agreement on
October 13, 1961.1 7 The background of these agreements is instructive in evaluating China's treaty conduct.
Since ancient times China and Burma have shared a 1,300-mile
frontier, not much altered by successive changes in Burma's political
status from a tributory state of China, through British domination and
Japanese occupation, to eventual independence. Because of the rugged
terrain, inhospitable land and malaria-infested jungles, much of the
boundary had never been clearly demarcated. During World War II,
s4 CHruNC- UA JEN-mIN KUxG-Ho-Kuo Kuo-wu-YuAN

Council Bulletin), No. 30, at 635-39 (July 20, 1957).
35 9 PRC TREATY SEms 68.
36Id. at 78.
37 10 PRC TRATY SMIEs 52.

KuNG-PAo (PRC

State
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the famed Burma Road became a life-line for Free China and increased
contacts between Burma and China resulted. After the war, Burma
became independent and inherited the undelimited boundary from
Britain. Its internal situation, however, was far from stable; recurrent
civil wars made it weak and easy prey for her neighbors. Confusion
was compounded in 1950 when remnants of Nationalist Chinese troops,
driven from mainland China, sought refuge in Burma and extralegally used Burmese territory as a base for sporadic forages into China
and for illicit trade. Burma's repeated protests to the United Nations
eventually led to the evacuation of the Nationalist forces under international supervision, although as of 1966, 2,000 or 3,000 Nationalists
reportedly remained in Burma."
Against such a background, the Prime Ministers of China and
Burma met in Peking on December 12, 1954, and declared it to be
their policy to delimit their boundary "at an appropriate time by means
of normal diplomatic channels." ' As a result of a border incident in
November, 1955, in which military forces of both countries were involved, the settlement of the entire border question acquired a sense of
urgency and, in early 1956, the two countries began in earnest the work
of demarcation.
By the end of 1957 the boundary was largely demarcated. Because the dispute over remaining areas involved national sensitivity on
both sides, its settlement may be of interest to the outside world. The
Meng-Mao triangular area (Namwan Assigned Tract), at the junction
of the Namwan and the Shweli Rivers, covers 85 square miles of territory which Britain recognized as belonging to China under a boundary
treaty of 1894.40 In order to safeguard a highway built to facilitate
troop movement, Britain acquired jurisdiction over this territory by
"perpetual lease" under an 1897 treaty.4 This leasehold was inherited
by Burma upon its independence. There had never been any question
as to where sovereignty resided. The PRC proposed that, since a
leasehold relationship would be incompatible with friendly relations
based on equality, it should be abrogated by Burma. Burma, on the
other hand, suggested, in view of the practical needs of Burma, that
38

See Harrison E. Salisbury's dispatch from Rangoon, dated June 19, 1966, in
N.Y. Times, June 22, 1966, at 6, col. 1.
89 For the text of the communique, see 3 CHUNG-HUA J52N-mIN KuNG-no-xuo
TuI-wAx KuA.X-HsI WEN-CHIEN CHI (Collection of Foreign Relations Documents
of the People's Republic of China) 216-17 (1954-55).
40 Convention between Great Britain and China, Giving Effect to Article III of
the Convention of the 24th July, 1886, Relative to Burmah and Thibet, March 1,
1894, in 87 BmrisH & FOREIGN STATE PxAPas 1894-1895, at 1311.
41Article 2 of the Agreement between Great Britain and China, Modifying the
Convention of March 1, 1894, Relative to Burmah and Thibet, Feb. 4, 1897, in 89
Baprris & FoREIGN STATE PAPERs 1896-1897, at 25.
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China exchange this area for 73 square miles of land belonging to the
Panhung and Panlao tribes, which, under an exchange of notes between
China and Britain dated June 18, 1941, were given to Burma. Although China considered the "1941 line" to be an unjust legalization
of Britain's conquests in the 1934 "Panhung Incident," and although
the line was never actually demarcated because of the Pacific War,
China nevertheless yielded to Burma's request. 2
Another disputed area lay north of the High Conical Peak. This
territory had remained unmarked for a long time and had been the
source of many incidents, the most serious of which took place in early
1911 when Britain occupied the Hpimaw area by force. Despite British
recognition on April 10, 1911, that Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang
(a total of 59 square miles) belonged to China, Britain continued to
occupy these three villages. Burma subsequently agreed to restore
these villages to China.
In the interest of efficient administration and avoidance of future
disputes, it was agreed that minor adjustments of the boundary should
be made so that villages should fall either entirely inside China or
Burma. Such adjustments resulted in China acquiring two boundaryintersected villages (Yawng Hok and Pan Wai) and Burma acquiring
four boundary-intersected villages (Umpha, Pan Kung, Pan Nawng
and Pan Wai). In addition, a small adjustment in the boundary
where it crosses the Taron River resulted in Burma acquiring an
additional five square miles of territory, and several minor adjustments
in the Shweli River area resulted in China acquiring less than two
square miles. China also renounced its right of participation in mining
enterprises at Lufang in Burma, which had been secured by the SinoBritish exchange of notes on June 18, 1941, as being inconsistent with
China's policy of opposing foreign prerogatives and respecting the
sovereignty of other countries.43
Under the above exchange of lands, Burma received less territory
from China than China received from Burma, although viewed in
terms of population and the value of land for teak extraction, the
exchange was more favorable to Burma. 4 Thus ended the Herculean
task of peaceably demarcating an almost impassable land. The
magnitude of the accomplishment may be seen by the fact that on
42

See Article II of the Boundary Treaty Between China and Burma, Oct. 1,
TREATY SERIES 68.
43
See art. IV, id.
44 U Nu, in urging unanimous Parliamentary ratification of the 1960 boundary
treaty, stated: "I sincerely believe the conclusion of this Treaty to be in Burma's
highest interests." Speech by Hon'ble Prime Minister Asking for the Approval of
the Parliament to the Ratification of the Boundary Treaty between the Union of
Burma and the People's Republic of China, Dec. 5, 1960, at 19.

1960, in 9 PRC
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the Burmese side alone, no less than 2,400 mules and 5,600 porters
were engaged in the operation 5
But has the new boundary been observed by China? A Burmese
official, well-acquainted with the border situation, stated that due to
the difficult terrain and sparse population, it is not always easy to
ascertain whether there has been a border violation. However, to his
knowledge, there has been no deliberate attempt on the part of the
Chinese to enter Burmese territory. 48
The theory has been advanced that China's liberal boundary policy
towards Burma is for propaganda purposes and is designed to isolate
India. 7 However, the negotiation for the Sino-Burmese treaties antedated the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Burmese boundary
settlement was not an isolated instance: China has also concluded
boundary treaties with Nepal," Pakistan,49 Afghanistan 50 and Mongolia,51 some of which also antedated the Sino-Indian dispute. Moreover, China repeatedly has called upon India to enter into negotiations
for a permanent boundary treaty without any preconditions. India,
on the other hand, has insisted, as a prerequisite to such negotiation,
that Chinese forces be withdrawn completely from what India regards
as its boundary, the validity of which (including the "McMahon Line")
is open to dispute."
45

d. at 9.

46This official also related an observation he had made in regard to the seriousness with which Chinese boundary surveyors viewed their work. When erecting
pillars as boundary markers, Chinese surveyors would engrave thereon Chinese characters on the side facing the Chinese territory, while Burmese surveyors used the
Burmese language on the Burmese side. One day, because of shortage of time, the
Chinese used a brush to write on the pillars, intending to do the engraving the next
day. Rain washed away the painted signs at night; instead of heeding the assurance
of the Burmese concerning the location of the pillars, the Chinese insisted on re-

measuring that part of the line all over again. While this anecdote merely may
reflect Chinese distrust of foreigners, the incident also may show meticulous care
for accuracy as well as a desire to avoid future disputes.
The same Burmese official also discounted any Chinese aggressive designs on
Burma, for if China were aggressively inclined, what could be a more convenient
pretext than to move troops across an undelimited boundary in pursuit of or retaliation against the Nationalist Chinese forces operating on Burmese territory? To
his knowledge, China has not intruded- into Burma despite many provocations.
47See, e.g., J. RowLAND, A HISTORY oF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS 138 (1967).
See also Editorial of N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1960, at 34, col. 1.
48Agreement of March 21, 1960, 9 PRC TREATY SERrEs 63; Treaty of October 5,

1961, 10 PRC TREATY SmEs 45; Agreement of January 20, 1963, 12 PRC
SmIEs
67.
49

Agreement of March 2, 1963, 12 PRC TEATYr

TREATY

Smlxs 64; Agreement of

March 26, 1965, noted'in JEN-MIN SHOU-TS'E (People's Handbook) 228 (1965).
60 Treaty of November 22, 1963, 12 PRC TREATY SERiEs 122; Agreement of
March 24, 1965, noted in JEN-MIN SHOU-TS'E 229 (1965).
61 Treaty of December 26, 1962, 11 PRC TRATY SERIs 19; Agreement of June
30, 1964, 13 PRC TRxAT SERms 78.
2 Official statements and correspondence between China and India from December
1961 to March 1962 concerning the boundary question are reproduced in 9 CruNC-HuA
JEN-mIN KuNf-ao-xuo Tus-wAi KuAw-Esi WEN-cHiEN Cxr, supra note 39, at
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Space does not permit a detailed examination of China's other
boundary treaties. Suffice it to state that all these treaties appear to
have been concluded on the basis of fair play and equality, and implemented through careful negotiation and surveying, with due regard
to historical boundaries, custom and particular needs of the contracting
parties. In the Sino-Mongolian border agreement of 1964, China reportedly gave up claims to about 25,000 square miles of territory along
the frontier."a This agreement alone covers 181 pages in the Treaty
Series of the People's Republic of China, making it one of the longest
treaties ever recorded. In the 1963 Protocol to the 1961 Sino-Nepalese
border treaty, China and Nepal agreed to maintain the status quo so
that Mount Everest, the highest peak in the world, would remain in
Nepal." In the 1963 Sino-Pakistani border agreement concerning
Sinkiang and territories under the de facto control of Pakistan,
despite China's worsened relations with India, it was stipulated that
the demarcation line would not prejudice India's claims or interests
pending the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. 5
Where borders were already well-defined, there have been no
reports of Chinese aggression. This is true even with respect to areas
like Hong Kong and large parts of Soviet Asia which China considers
as having been wrongfully wrought from it through "unequal treaties."
Even the leased territories of Macao " and Kowloon, 57 whose existence
1-227. See, e.g., communications from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
Indian Embassy in Peking, dated February 26, 1962, id. at 1, and from the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, dated March 13,
1962, id. at 14.
53 N.Y. Times, June 16, 1964, at 7, col. 6.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1963, at 2, col. 7.
55
ee Article 6 of the Agreement of March 2, 1963, supra note 49. Indeed,
Pakistan reportedly boasted that China gave her "most of the fertile lands." Chairman 5Mao to Edgar Snow, in A. L. STRoxG, LETTRrs

FRom CHINA

124 (1963).

6 It may be noted that despite more than four centuries of Portuguese presence,
Macao has never been ceded to Portugal by China. Article 2 of the Treaty of
Friendship and Commerce of 1887 Between China and Portugal, in CHuNG-wAi
T'IAo-YfxH HuI-PiEN (Collection of Chinese Treaties)

412 (1964),

for example,

merely accorded the Portuguese the right of "yung-chil kuan-li" (permanent residence
and administration) ; contrast this with the English text appearing in 78 BRITISH &
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1886-1887, at 521, which used the expression "perpetual occupation and government," thus favoring the Portuguese. Article 3 forbade Portugal
to transfer its right to third states without China's consent. Of special interest is
Article 46 which provided for automatic extensions of the treaty for ten-year periods
unless "demand be made on either side within sLx months after the end of ten years."
Id. at 529. Pursuant to this article, the treaty lapsed in 1928. China has since refused
to incorporate similar provisions in subsequent treaties with Portugal. Cf. the Preliminary Treaty of Friendship and Commerce Between China and Portugal, Dec. 19,
1928, in 130 BRITISH & FopxIGN STATE PAPERS 1927-1928, at 491-92, in which no
mention was made of Macao.
67 The New Territories of Kowloon were leased to Great Britain for 99 years,
under the Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory Between
China and Great Britain, June 9, 1898, in 90 BITSar & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS

1897-1898, at 17. The Convention also provides for continued exercise of jurisdiction by Chinese officials in the city of Kowloon, access to the waters of Mirs Bay
and Deep Bay by Chinese war vessels and the right of Chinese officials and people to
cross between Kowloon and Hsinan (San On).
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may be regarded as incompatible with the principle of the sovereign
equality of states, have not been reabsorbed by China following recent
incidents in both places.' Elsewhere, Chinese "volunteers" were withdrawn from Korea in 1958, and there is no published evidence that
Chinese forces have entered Viet Nam. Border relations between China
and Laos, which has undergone continual civil strife, are reported by
a Laotian Embassy spokesman to be normal even in areas controlled by
anti-Pathet Lao forces.
B. Ambassadorial Talks
Despite United States nonrecognition of the PRC, ambassadorial
talks between the two countries, begun in Geneva in mid-1955 and then
58
Incidents in Macao occurred when police were dispatched to Taipa Island to
stop laborers from constructing a primary school without a permit from the Public
Works Bureau. The ensuing conflict and charges of police brutality triggered rioting
in Macao itself in which eight were killed, 212 injured and 61 arrested. The Government of Macao subsequently bowed to Chinese demands to punish responsible officials,
to release all arrested, to proffer public apologies, to compensate the injured and
families of the killed, and to bar Nationalist Chinese activities in Macao as well as
to turn over alleged secret agents to mainland China. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1966, at 1, col. 5; Dec. 10, 1966, at 21, col. 5; Dec. 13, 1966, at 1, col. 2; Dec. 18,
1966, at 7, col. 1; Dec. 23, 1966, at 3, col. 3; Jan. 4, 1967, at 46, col. 1; Jan. 30, 1967,
at 2, col. 7-8.
Anti-British riots erupted in Hong Kong and Kowloon in the aftermath of labor
disputes which shut down the largest cement factory, strikes by transport and electric
power workers, arrests of pro-Peking newsmen and the British move to close the
Kowloon border. In the most serious single border incident, five Hong Kong police
were reported killed and twelve others wounded when Chinese demonstrators, aided
by units of the "people's militia" (irregulars guarding frontier regions), opened
fire on Hong Kong police who attempted to rout them with wooden projectiles shot
from anti-riot guns and tear gas. The Chinese version, as described in a protest
note delivered to the British Charg6 d'Affaires in Peking, was that Hong Kong
police had started the trouble by firing at Chinese demonstrators on the Chinese
side of the frontier. The note stated that Chinese from the Hong Kong side had
crossed into China to join a rally denouncing Britain. When they tried to return
to Hong Kong, they were confronted by police "throwing tear bombs and opening
fire at them, and at the same time firing at our side." The Chinese claimed that one
Chinese was killed and eight were wounded. See Washington Post, July 10, 1967,
at A16, col. 4.
More serious conflicts were subsequently averted by reinforcements from regular
Chinese armed units who held back the demonstrators on the Chinese side and, at
one time, even fired machine-gun bursts to prevent them from crossing the border.
See Washington Post, July 9, 1967, at Al, col. 5; July 10, 1967, at A16, col. 2;
Aug. 25, 1967, at A18, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1967, at 4, col. 4; Aug. 8,
1967, at 12, col. 1; Aug. 27, 1967, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
It may be noted that while the British move to close the Kowloon border might
have been designed to reduce border tensions in the face of anti-British riots, the
effect was to worsen tensions and to raise the question of the legal status of a
leased territory. Peking has taken the position that a border cannot be closed in
a territory that is Chinese and, to the extent that it applies to Kowloon, the position
is supportable by the 1898 Sino-British Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong
Kong Territory, supra note 57, as well as by the view that "in strict law, these
[leased territories] remain the property of the leasing state." 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
As interpreted by
Stanley Karnow, Washington Post reporter in Hong Kong, recent Chinese protests
stressing China's territorial rights "are regarded as an attempt to affirm a legalistic
Chinese position, rather than a threat to take over Hong Kong." But ironically
"Peking's assertions are inciting Kwantung agitators to push their way over the
frontiers, while the Chinese army is visibly working to hold them back." Washington
Post, Aug. 25, 1967, at A18, col. 1.
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moved to Warsaw in 1958, have continued at intermittent intervals to
this day. These talks, according to Mr. Kenneth T. Young, former
Ambassador to Thailand and now President of the Asia Society, have
served the useful purposes of "reducing miscalculations, clarifying intentions and explaining proposals." 6' Their genesis may be traced
to the April, 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea, when Wang Ping-nan,
Secretary General of the Chinese Delegation, first met with U. Alexis
Johnson, Coordinator for the United States Delegation. In the same
year, the United States asked the United Kingdom, which maintained
a sub-Ambassadorial tie with Peking, to use Britain's good offices to
obtain the release of American citizens detained in China. Peking
replied by suggesting direct talks instead. This suggestion, along with
Premier Chou En-lai's request at the Bandung Conference to "sit
down" with the United States to discuss and negotiate the "elimination of tensions" in East Asia, led eventually to this unique diplomatic experiment in the use of direct talks as a substitute for normal
relations.
Following talks on the consular level, which began in June 1954
between United States Consul General Gowen and Chinese Consul General Shen Ping,6" the ambassadorial discussions between Wang Pingnan, Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw, and U. Alexis Johnson, United
States Ambassador in Prague, ran smoothly at the outset. Agreements were soon reached on both procedural and substantive matters.
On the procedural side, Wang had originally wanted open meetings, while Johnson called for closed meetings. In the end, both sides
agreed that contents of their discussion should not be divulged except
by mutual agreement and that no official minutes should be prepared
jointly. With but one exception, both sides appear to have adhered
to this arrangement, although general statements subsequently have
been made concerning the position of a country on a matter which had
formed the subject of discussion at the meetings. The lone exception
occurred on September 7, 1966, when Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan,
who had replaced Wang Ping-nan, summoned a press conference in
Warsaw immediately following an ambassadorial talk, in order to
make public a statement delivered to United States Ambassador John
A. Gronouski. The press conference may have been designed to refute
Soviet charges that China was plotting with the United States in
Viet Nam or to quiet speculations aroused by reports that Chinese
Foreign Minister Chen Yi had made a somewhat more moderate
statement on Chinese attitudes towards the United States to a Japanese
6

Young, American Dealings with Peking, 45 FOREIGN AFFAiRs, Oct. 1966, at 76.
60 See Lzn, supra note 12, at 182.
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delegation headed by former Minister for Foreign Affairs Kosaka.
Whatever his motivation, however, the press conference held by
Ambassador Wang constituted a breach of confidence.
On the substantive side, after fourteen meetings in six weeks, the
ambassadorial talks resulted in the issuance on September 10, 1955, of
"agreed parallel unilateral statements," which were to resolve the
problem of repatriation of civilians."' These statements were included
in the PRC Treaty Series, thus endowed with a treaty character by
Peking. The United States, on the other hand, has avoided regarding
them as either a treaty or an executive agreement.
In addition to twelve American civilians whose exit permits from
China had been promised in a Chinese announcement of September 6,
1955, two lists subsequently were made public by the Department of
State: the first containing the names of ten Americans who, according
to the Department of State, would be released "soon" by the People's
Republic of China, and the second containing the names of nineteen
Americans who would be released "expeditiously." With respect to
Chinese civilians in the United States, it was estimated that a total
of 129 Chinese students and scientists were being detained in the
United States during the Korean War. However, the detainers
against all of them reportedly had been removed before the ambassa0
1 In view of the fact that the provisions governing the repatriatiori of Chinese
civilians from the United States apply mutatis inutandis to the repatriation of American civilians from China (except that India was to render its good offices for China
in the United States and the United Kingdom for the United States in China), only
those portions of the statements dealing with the return of the Americans need be
quoted:
The Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China have agreed to announce the measures which their respective Governments have adopted concerning the return of civilians to their
respective countries ...
With respect to Americans in the People's Republic of China, Ambassador
Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the People's Republic of China, has informed
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson:

E1]

The People's Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the People's
Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to
do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate
measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.
[2]
The Government of the United Kingdom will be invited to assist in the
return to the United States of those Americans who desire to do so as
follows:
a. If any American in the People's Republic of China believes
that, contrary to the declared policy of the People's Republic of China,
he is encountering obstruction in departure, he may so inform the
office of the charg6 d'affaires of the United Kingdom in the People's
Republic of China and request it to make representations on his behalf
to the Government of the People's Republic of China. If desired by
the United States, the Government of the United Kingdom may also
investigate the facts in any such case.
b. If any American in the People's Republic of China who desires
to return to the United States has difficulty in paying his return ex-
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dorial talks began and at least fifty Chinese reportedly had left the
United States by September 10th, while three more planned to leave
by September 17th.0
With the repatriation issue apparently settled, Wang next wished
to discuss "other practical matters at issue," such as a meeting between
Chou En-lai and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, establishment
of diplomatic relations and exchange of newsmen and trade. Moreover, Wang would not insist upon an American agreement to withdraw
from Taiwan as a precondition to further talks. The United States,
however, refused to discuss these matters until Peking released all
American prisoners and agreed to a joint renunciation of the use of
force in the Taiwan Strait. It was at this point. that Wang insisted
that the earlier announcements covered only civilians and not "prisoners," claiming that he had never discussed or raised the issue of
the repatriation of Chinese "prisoners" in the United States, but only
of Chinese students, and that none of the Chinese "prisoners" in the
United States had been released.
In order to counter this point, a careful census was taken of
Chinese nationals in federal and state prisons and arrangements
were made with federal and state authorities to commute the sentence
of any Chinese prisoner who wished immediate repatriation. At the
same time, Indians were sought to interview Chinese prisoners to
ascertain their wishes. The census disclosed about 110 Chinese
nationals in prison in the United States as of 1956.
When confronted with the above fact and an offer to exchange
Chinese for American prisoners, Wang alleged the existence of a plot
to inflict a propaganda defeat on Peking, comparable to the Chinese
prisoner-of-war issue in Korea, and that only those Chinese prisoners
who did not want to return to China would be included in the list of
prisoners. Subsequently, the American Red Cross interviewed some
ninety Chinese prisoners. Among these, six reportedly indicated their
desire to be repatriated, although five later changed their minds and
only one reportedly returned to China.
The United States view was clearly that prisoners were to be
included among repatriates under the "unilateral but identical" announcements. Ambassador Johnson stated that there was no doubt
in his mind that both he and Ambassador Wang were referring to
penses, the Government of the United Kingdom may render him
financial assistance needed to permit his return.

[3]
The Government of the People's Republic of China will give wide publicity
'to the foregoing arrangements and the office of the charg6 d'affaires of the
United Kingdom in the People's Republic of China may also do so.
32 U.S. DEP'T STATE Butvi 456 (1955); 4 PRC TREATY SmUES 1.
62 N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1955, at 3, col. 3-4, 6.
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"prisoners" in their discussion of the repatriation issue, noting also
that in the texts of the announcements, the generic terms "civilians" and
"Americans" were used without any exception as to prisoners.6
Kenneth Young ' describes the ambassadorial negotiation as one
concerning "the repatriation of some 40 Americans incarcerated in
Chinese Communist jails," and the ensuing agreement as one "on
repatriation of prisoners." On the other hand, the United States
position that the repatriation agreement covered "prisoners" appears to
be undercut by its own failure to initiate steps to repatriate Chinese
prisoners (in contradistinction to students and scientists) until the
dispute came to the fore at a much later date.
There remains the question whether Peking had agreed to the
two lists of names of those Americans to be released "soon" and those
to be released "expeditiously," as published by the Department of
State on September 10, 1955. The second list specifically included the
names of people still in Chinese prisons today, such as John T. Downey
and Richard Fecteau. If Peking had indeed agreed to the content of
this list, negotiations for the immediate release of remaining American
prisoners profitably might be reopened on the basis of that agreement,
rather than on the ground that "prisoners" as such were the objects
of the "unilateral but identical" announcements.
It may be noted also that henceforth the "unilateral but identical"
formula may not, as a general rule, be acceptable to Peking. Thus, in
discussing the question of exchanging correspondents with the United
States, Peking has said:
The American draft takes the form of statements to be
issued by the ambassadors of the two countries separately.
We remember that the agreement of the two sides on the
return of civilians to their countries also took this form. But
the fact that the U.S. side has so far failed to seriously implement the agreement shows that this form does not have
enough binding force on the U.S. side. To prevent the U.S.
side from again violating the agreement, the Chinese side
resolutely maintains that all agreements between the two sides
must take the form of joint announcements of both sides, and
no longer take that of statements issued by two sides
separately.6 5
6 3 Interview With U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Ambassador, in Tokyo, Japan, Dec.
1966.64
Young, supra note 59.
85 PEamG REmw, Sept. 14, 1960, No. 37, at 30.
An exception may be noted, however, when Peking suggested recourse to parallel
unilateral declarations by both sides (perhaps as an interim measure) to ban the use
of nuclear weapons. This followed Washington's rejection of an earlier proposal
to conclude a treaty to this end after Peking had successfully conducted an atomic
test in October, 1964. PEKING REVIW, Jan. 1, 1965, No. 1, at 20. See also M.
HALpEiN & D.

PERKixGs, COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL 127-28 (1965).
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In any event, this whole episode may serve to underscore the importance in any future negotiations with China of arriving at a text
free from all ambiguity, even if this can only be accomplished by
expending a great deal of time.
C. Korean Armistice Agreement
It is not the purpose of the present study to trace the political and
military developments in connection with the Korean War, to deal
with such legal issues as the validity, binding force and compliance
records of the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the Potsdam
Declaration of July 1945 and the various United Nations resolutions
concerning Korea. Attention is focused rather on the record of Chinese
compliance with the Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27, 1953, between the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command
(UNC) on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army (KPA) and the Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers (CPV) on the other. 6 An examination of this record
yields valuable insight into Chinese treaty practice in times of stress.
The present study is the first ever undertaken of the records of
the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) by non-military personnel
in the West. One reason for the previous lack of such a study is that,
although the "Unified Command" was created pursuant to a Security
Council resolution of July 7, 1950, under which the Command would
report to the Security Council "as appropriate," there has been no
report to the Council since the conclusion of the Armistice in 1953.67
The present study was undertaken in Seoul, Korea, where a complete
record of Armistice compliance and complaints of violations is kept,
and was supplemented by interviews with officials, including those of
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
Four major items, each of which will be discussed below, were
covered in the Armistice Agreement: the establishment of a Military
Demarcation Line and a Demilitarized Zone (Article I); Concrete
Arrangements for Cease-fire and Armistice (Article II); Arrangements Relating to Prisoners of War (Article III); and Recommendations to the Governments Concerned (Article IV).
Article I provides for the fixing of a Military Demarcation Line
(MDL) and mutual withdrawal for a distance of two kilometers from
the Line so as to separate the opposing forces by a Demilitarized Zone
061953 YEARBoo0 OF THE UzfrrED NATioNs 136-46. The Agreement is included
in 2 PRC TREATY SmuEs 382 as an addendum, thus indicating its semi-official status.
The United States, on the other hand, includes it in 4 U.S.T. 234, T.I.A.S. No. 2782
(1953).
67 Press Service OPI Briefing, United Nations, Nov. 4, 1966.
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(DMZ) which acts as a buffer preventing the occurrence of incidents
which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. The number of persons, military and civilian, permitted to enter the Zone from each side
for purposes of civil administration and relief shall not exceed 1,000
at any one time. Civil administration and relief in the northern
half of the Zone shall be the joint responsibility of KPA/CPV, while
that in the southern half shall be the responsibility of UNC. "No
person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized
Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration
and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military
Armistice Commission." Nor shall any one be permitted to cross the
Line without specific authorization of the Commission. "Neither side
shall exercise any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized
Zone." Complete freedom of movement, however, is assured to the
"Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer
Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission . . . , its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams

with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the
Military Armistice Commission." Civil police of both sides may not
carry heavy or automatic weapons, and must wear proper identification.
In actual practice, a clear distinction between "civil" and "military" personnel is well-nigh impossible, automatic weapons can easily
be concealed, collusion with civil police on one's own side of the DMZ
can be taken for granted and the crossing of the MDL on the ground
and in the air and sea, whether for espionage, sabotage or other purposes, has been recurrent. In the year 1966 alone, for example, the
UNC announced that 24 of its soldiers were killed on 14 separate occasions by "armed killer bandits" from the other side, the single largest
incident (in which six Americans and one South Korean lost their
lives) coinciding with President Johnson's visit to South Korea. The
KPA/CPV side, on the other hand, accused the UNC of 8,460
violations of the Armistice Agreement during the twelve-month period,
although 8,218-or 97 per cent-involved routine administrative matters, including 7,529 cases of alleged improper identification (e.g.,
armbands) of UNC personnel in the DMZ.'
Chinese compliance with Article I is of direct relevance to the
present study. A thorough examination was undertaken of the files of
MAC prior to October 26, 1958, the date Chinese forces were withdrawn from Korea, revealing that only one violation specifically involving Chinese personnel had been charged by the UNC at MAC.
8 Year end statement by UNC at 237th MAC meeting in Panmunjom, given in
briefing by UNC Rear in Camp Zama, Japan, Dec., 1966.
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In this case, the UNC alleged that two unarmed men in the vicinity
of Koyangdae crossed the MDL at 8 a.m., August 6, 1953, to a distance of 600 meters south of the Line. The two men engaged in
conversation with members of the UNC, one stating that he was a
Korean who had lived in Manchuria for a long time before being taken
into the army, and the other stating that he was Chinese. When
asked why they had crossed the Line, they said they had come to pick
up communication wire. To the question whether they were from
the Third Regiment, First Division, First Army, they replied, "yes."
They returned to their side of the line at 12:30 p.m. the same day.'
At the MAC meeting, the KPA/CPV side readily admitted that its
personnel, in the course of clearing hazards in DMZ, had crossed the
MDL by mistake, and stated: "We express regret for this incident." 70
The above discussion, of course, cannot be taken to mean that
there was only one Chinese violation of Article I; other violations well
might have gone undetected or have been taken up at the Secretaries
meetings, which handle only routine administrative matters, not serious
violations of the Armistice Agreement. It is noteworthy, however,
that through the years, only one incident specifically involving Chinese
personnel was serious enough to reach the MAC, and the Chinese
readily admitted and expressed regret for the incident
Article II not only calls for a cease-fire and a mutual withdrawal
of forces from the DMZ, but also specifies that, pending a political
settlement, the relative military combat power of the two opposing
sides must be maintained at the same level as on July 27, 1953. To
ensure this, personnel were only to be exchanged or rotated man-forman, and weapons were only to be exchanged piece-for-piece and were
to be of the same type and capability as when the agreement was
signed. No additional weapons or new types of weapons were to be
brought into Korea by either side. For the purpose of supervising
the implementation of this provision and settling disputes which might
arise, the MAC was established to be composed of ten senior officers,
five appointed by the UNC and five appointed jointly by the
KPA/CPV. The MAC was to be assisted in its tasks by: (a) Joint
Observer Teams, composed of officers of equal numbers from both
sides, to investigate alleged violations of the Agreement occurring in
the DMZ or in the Han River Estuary, and (b) the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission (NNSC) composed of officers from Sweden,
Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose functions were to carry
out supervision, observation, inspection and investigation outside the
DMZ or at the request of the MAC. The NNSC was in turn to be
69 Record of the 9th meeting of MAC, Aug. 8, 1953.

70 Id.
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assisted by Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNIT), ten of which
were to be stationed at five ports of entry under the military control
of the UNC and five under the military control of the KPA/CPV.
Officers of the teams were to be accorded full convenience of movement
within the areas and over agreed upon routes of communication.
Despite this elaborate machinery, disputes arose almost immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. Some of these
may have been due to honest differences of opinion in construing the
language of the Agreement. For example, does the term "combat
aircraft" include a "trainer" or "reconnaissance plane"? Do spare
parts which could be assembled into "combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
weapons, and ammunition" fall under the restrictions of Article II?
There were, however, clear violations by both sides. Thus, contrary to Paragraph 13(d) of the Agreement, which requires both
sides to report incoming and outgoing combat aircraft, the KPA/CPV
has not submitted a single such report. Upon complaint by the UNC
to NNSC on October 12, 1953, a Mobile Inspection Team was dispatched to conduct an investigation of an airfield near Uiju where
newly arrived aircraft were reportedly located. The UNC supplied
the following version of the investigation: the Team was at the airfield
for only 3 hours and 55 minutes during the first six days of investigation. Twenty-five minutes were spent in a moving vehicle, guided
by the airfield commander, while the remaining time was spent in
discussion with the commander before and after the conducted tour.
Although the Team reported that no aircraft crates were observed,
there were numerous aircraft present which they were not permitted
to inspect and for which the airfield commander refused to make any
satisfactory accounting. No permission was given to inspect the
northern and southern sides of the airfield, nor the various means by
which the crates or craft might have been introduced, nor the areas
where the alleged crates might have been hidden. Further inspection,
proposed by the Swiss and Swedish members of the Team, was voted
down by the Polish and Czechoslovak members. Not until the seventh
day after its arrival was the Team permitted to make another inspection
under the guidance of the airfield commander. Again, no evidence of
crates was found. 71
It was ostensibly this type of violation by the KPA/CPV which
prompted the UNC to announce, at the 75th MAC meeting on June
21, 1957, the temporary suspension of the operation of Paragraph
13 (d) of the Agreement until such time as relative military balance had
been restored and the other side, by its action, had demonstrated its
71 Record of the 38th meeting of MAC, March 9, 1954; Record of the 60th
meeting of MAC, July 5, 1955.
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willingness to comply with said provision. Since then, the UNC
has refused to report the movement of any combat material going in
and out of Korea.
The compliance record of the UNC actually was not above reproach, even before it unilaterally suspended the operation of Paragraph 13(d). Despite Paragraph 13(j) of the Agreement, which
grants diplomatic privileges and immunities to NNSC personnel, there
were many incidents of mistreatment of neutral nations personnel in
South Korea.72 More seriously, NNIT personnel were prevented from
boarding American vessels to inspect boxes reportedly containing
combat material,73 from carrying out inspection work in the harbor
of Inchon 7 4 and from conducting spot-check inspections in Pusan on
August 20, 1955, and in Taegu on August 8, 1955, except by helicopter.75 These restrictions occurred despite: (a) Preliminary Instruction No. 21 of the NNSC which states that "the team has to
insist upon boarding a ship only in case its supervision and inspection
cannot be carried out properly by any other means"; (b) Paragraph
13 (g) of the Armistice Agreement which affords to NNIT personnel
"all possible assistance and co-operation" as well as "full convenience
of movement" between the headquarters of NNSC and the ports of
entry or "the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have
been reported to have occurred."
There were also instances of incorrect reporting or omissions of
incoming and outgoing material. On September 4, 1953, the NNIT
in Pusan uncovered 106 4.2-caliber mortars which the UNC introduced under the guise of "Supplies for PX." The UNC report of
December 9, 1953 did not contain any figure for incoming combat
aircraft, although reports of the NNIT stated that at least nine
craft were introduced in the same period.
At the 70th MAC meeting, on May 31, 1956, the UNC announced that because of obstructions and violations by the KPA/CPV
and the conduct of the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the NNSC
and the NNIT, it had decided to suspend provisionally performance of
its part of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing
operations by the NNSC and NNIT in the area under the control of
72 Letter from NNSC to MAC, Sept. 8, 1953, discussed at the 18th meeting of
MAC, September 9, 1953. See also Record of the 41st meeting of MAC, April 20,
1954; Record of the 45th meeting of MAC, August 3, 1954; Letter from NNSC

Aug. 10, 1955.
to MAC,
73

Letter from NNSC to MAC, Sept. 17, 1953, concerning inability to board the
steamship "Morning Light!' in Pusan; Report of NNIT No. 8 (Pusan), cited in
Letter from NNSC to MAC, Oct 10, 1953, and discussed at the 26th meeting of
Oct. 20, 1953, and at the 41st meeting of MAC, April 20, 1954.
MAC,
1
4 Record of the 41st meeting of MAC, April 20, 1954.
75 Report of NNIT, Aug. 20, 1955, discussed at the 69th meeting of MAC,

Feb. 25, 1956.
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UNC. Consequently, all NNSC and NNIT personnel were withdrawn from the territory under the military control of the UNC to the
Demilitarized Zone by June 9, 1956. This was followed by similar
withdrawal from the north by June 12, 1956.
In evaluating Chinese performance under Article II of the
Armistice Agreement, it should be noted that, although there is evidence that new aircraft have been introduced into North Korea since
the Armistice, their origin has not been determined. There have been
unsubstantiated rumors that these new MIGs came from the Soviet
Union, rather than China. The question still remains as to Chinese
responsibility under the Agreement in view of the existence of a joint
KPA/CPV undertaking to prohibit the introduction of these MIGs
and to report any such introduction to the MAC. The exact extent
of such responsibility hinges, in turn, upon the question whether, in
this instance, North Korea has acted as an agent for the Chinese, as
an equal partner with China or in disregard of Chinese wishes for
compliance. As of this writing, information is still insufficient to
clarify the above picture.
The question of prisoner repatriation was governed, by Article III
as well as by the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission, which was signed on June 8, 1953, and incorporated into
the Armistice Agreement. The principle against forcible repatriation
of prisoners was adopted, 76 and a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India (Chairman) was established to oversee the prisoners' custody, repatriation and settlement.
The repatriation issue was a complex one, involving the ascertainment of a prisoner's state of mind and intent. Unfortunately, prisoners
became pawns in the grip of power politics, and there were many instances of bad faith, coercion, brutality, unfair pressure and terrorizing
by secret agents planted among prisoners. The most serious incident
involved the unilateral mass release of 27,000 North Korean prisoners
by President Syngman Rhee on June 18, 1953, in violation of the
Terms of Reference for NNRC 7 7 -_an action which brought immediate
76 The principle had been strenuously opposed by the KPA/CPV, resulting in
a delay of almost two years in the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The
KPA/CPV cited the following provisions in the 1949 Geneva Convention relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, as evidence that international
law was opposed to the "voluntary repatriation" principle:
Article 7. Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in
entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention ....
Article 118. Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay
after the cessation of active hostilities. ...
The UNC argued that the spirit of the Geneva Convention was to protect the
best interests of prisoners. See C. Joy, How COMMUNISTS NEzGorlAT 153 (1955).
77 Paragraph 1 of the Terms of Reference, 1953 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITE NATIONS
144, provides in part:
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repudiation by President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and
the UNC.
Although space does not permit a discussion of other incidents,
on the whole, more violations by the UNC than by the KPA/CPV
were uncovered or confirmed by NNRC personnel and reported at
MAC meetings.7" The following reasons may be advanced: (a) there
were more prisoners held by the UNC than by the KPA/CPV; (b)
President Rhee was known to be unsympathetic with many of the
UNC objectives and had thus often pursued an independent course
of action; (c) the UNC may have allowed the NNRC more freedom
to seek out and investigate violations than did the KPA/CPV.
A discussion of the repatriation issue is not complete without a
reference to American airmen and civilians allegedly shot down over
Manchuria, China, during the Korean War. The dispute centered
In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to
exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides
to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which
shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who,
while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right
to be repatriated.
Paragraph 4 provides:
All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation
following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released
from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon
as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the
effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.
Id. 78
While there was no mention of any Chinese or North Korean violation of the
prisoners repatriation provisions of the Armistice Agreement in the NNSC or NNRC
reports as discussed at the MAC meetings, the following references to UNC violations,
in addition to Rhee's unilateral release of 27,000 prisoners, may be noted: At the
28th meeting of MAC held on November 18, 1953, reference was made to the investigation conducted by Neutral Nations Mobile Teams in POW camps of the UNC
at Koje-do, Yongdong-po and the Imlin River Bridge, which confirmed UNC violations of the Military Armistice Agreement and the Agreement for the Operation
of the Joint Red Cross Teams; at the 29th meeting of MAC on November 21, 1953,
a formal report by the NNRC, dated November 15, was cited to show that the Indian
Custodian Force on November 7th had intercepted a military radio set hidden in
food supplies being sent into the Tongjang-ni POW camp. The Indian Force on the
same day also discovered that nurses of the 64th Field Hospital of the U.S. Army
located in the same POW camp communicated with "secret agents" in compound 49
nearby and exchanged letters, one of which was intercepted by a sentry on duty.
The NNRC stated that it "considers the facts deriving from the report mentioned
above as an abuse of providing medical support by the UNC and as a violation of
the Terms of Reference for NNRC," and requested that the UNC take "immediate
measures to prevent any further illegal activities of personnel employed in the 64th
Field Hospital."
At the 31st meeting of MAC on December 1, 1953, a formal notification by
NNRC dated November 24th stated that on November 8th the Indian Custodian
Force had intercepted a letter from a secret agent who was attempting to enter the
Tongiang-ni POW camp. The letter contained directives from President Rhee and
the Nationalist Chinese Embassy in Pusan stating that "explanations should not be
attended-a reference to the efforts of representatives of other nations to confer with
soldiers held prisoner who refused repatriation. It promised that the Army of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) would advance and attack the Indian forces, if the latter
attempted to coerce prisoners into attending the explanations.
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on the question whether these men should be considered "prisoners
of war" in the context of the Armistice Agreement and hence entitled
to repatriation. The dispute eventually led to a personal visit to Peking
by the late Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskj6ld. Subsequently, military personnel were released, without
any reference to their rights under the Armistice Agreement. Some
civilian personnel, however, remain in Chinese prisons to this day.
Article IV of the Armistice Agreement provides that the military
commanders of both sides shall recommend to the governments concerned that, within three months after the coming into force of the
Agreement, "a political conference of a higher level of both sides be
held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea,
the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." Inasmuch as the
specific obligation only consisted of making the recommendations, without regard to their actual implementation, both sides may be said to
have complied with Article IV upon signing the Armistice Agreement.
It may be noted that the proposed conference was subsequently
held in April 1954 in Geneva without any conclusive result. On April
9, 1956, the Governments of the PRC and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea proposed the convening of a conference of countries
concerned to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea
and the peaceful unification and demilitarization of Korea, but the
proposal was rejected after a meeting of the representatives of sixteen
nations at the Department of State. The General Headquarters of
CPV nevertheless announced, on February 20, 1958, that it had decided to withdraw its forces completely from Korea by stages before
the end of 1958, with the first stage to be completed before April 30,
1958. On March 12, 1958, the KPA/CPV side requested the NNSC
to supervise and inspect the first stage withdrawal of 80,000 men,
scheduled to take place between March 15 and April 30, 1958, through
the port of Sinuiju. At the meeting of March 14, 1958, in Panmunjom,
the request was welcomed by the Polish and Czechoslovak members
of the NNSC but was rejected after objections by the Swedish and
Swiss members on the ground that such activities lay outside the legal
competence of the NNSC. At the 88th meeting of MAC held on
October 27, 1958, the KPA/CPV announced completion of the withdrawal by CPV in three stages during the period of March 15 to
October 26, 1958. As far as can be ascertained from the records of
the MAC, there is no indication that the CPV has not completely withdrawn its forces from Korea or has subsequently re-entered Korea.
A few general observations may be appropriate before concluding
the present discussion. Contrary to the oft-repeated view that the
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Korean Armistice Agreement has been violated continually by the
Chinese, the Chinese policy appears to be one of careful observance
of the Agreement. Despite the fact that the NNSC has often been
paralyzed as a result of disagreements between the Swedes and Swiss,
on the one side, and the Poles and Czechs on the other, the Chinese
have continued to emphasize its role. The Chinese attitude may be
seen from the following incident. In nearly identical notes dated
January 27, 1955, Sweden and Switzerland requested Peking's approval for a reduction of their personnel in the NNSC on the ground
of financial difficulties. Peking's reply stressed the important contribution of the NNSC in maintaining peace in Korea and refused to
consider the possibility of terminating its activities, based as they were
on the Armistice Agreement. However, since the Agreement did not
specify the number of personnel to be maintained by the NNSC, and
in view of the financial burden imposed upon the Swedish and Swiss
Governments, the PRC would not object to the proposed reduction of
personnel so long as NNSC activities would not be adversely affected."
In line with this emphasis on the neutral nations' peace-keeping role in
Korea, the PRC seriously protested the UNC's suspension of neutral
nations' activities in South Korea, eviction of NNSC and NNIT personnel to the DMZ and refusal to report on the movements of combat
material in Korea, as required by Paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice
Agreement.
To summarize: in the only known incident in which unarmed
Chinese crossed the MDL in violation of the Armistice Agreement,
Chinese acknowledgment and expressions of regret were swiftly made;
restrictions on neutral personnel movement and communication in
North Korea appears to be the sole responsibility of the North Korean
authorities, and in at least one instance, the record shows that the
Chinese have interceded on behalf of freedom of movement for Swedish
personnel; the origin of new MIGs introduced into North Korea since
the Armistice cannot be ascertained with any finality, and there are
indications that they came from the Soviet Union, rather than China;
although CPV insistence on a principle of forcible repatriation of
prisoners accounted for a long delay in the signing of the Armistice
Agreement, once the principle was agreed to, the PRC appears to have
complied; and when the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Korea and peaceful unification of Korea through free elections
under the supervision of neutral nations could not be realized, the
PRC unilaterally withdrew its forces from Korea, which, in effect,
79 See Chinese memoranda to the Swedish and Swiss diplomatic missions, Feb. 17,
1955, reproduced in 3 CHUNG-HUA JEX-mIN KUNG-Ho-KUO TUEi-wAx KuAx-Esl
Wm-c~rEx Cr,

s'upra note 39, at 236.
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complied with important parts of both Article IV of the Armistice
Agreement and the General Assembly Resolution of February 1, 1951.
Lest the PRC be involved in another Korean War by a North
Korean attempt to reunify Korea by force, the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea provides
that:
The Contracting Parties hold that the unification of
Korea must be realized along peaceful and democratic lines
and that such a solution accords exactly with the national
interests of the Korean people and the aim of preserving
peace in the Far East.'
Since the summer of 1966, the PRC's military disengagement has
apparently been extended to the conference table: its seats at the MAC
in Panmunjom have remained unoccupied; simultaneous interpretation
into Chinese during the Secretaries' meetings has been discontinued;
and only a few minor officials now sit, at a respectable distance from
the Koreans and Americans, during Panmunjom conferences.
D. Fisheries Agreements
Among the most unique of all international agreements are the
various Sino-Japanese fisheries agreements concluded since 1955.
These agreements, although entered into by fisheries associations of
the two countries, regulate matters traditionally reserved to sovereign
states, such as the delineation of fishing zones, the fixing of the number
of fishing vessels permitted to enter such zones by each party and
the right to provisions and shelter in ports. Hence, prior governmental approval, if not actual formulation, of the contents of the agreements may well be presumed. While the Japanese Foreign Office does
not accord official standing to these agreements, the PRC has included
them in its Treaty Series, thus imbuing them with a treaty-like
character.
A study of the background and development of the fisheries relations between the two countries sheds interesting light not only on
the interplay of political, economic and legal forces, but also on
8oTreaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance Between China
and North Korea, 1961, art. 6, in PRC GooDwmL TaRErris 45-50. This article
recalls the Chiang-Dulles joint communiqu6 of October 23, 1958, which reads in part:
The Government of the Republic of China considers that the restoration of
freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that
the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the
Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its
mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yatsen's three people's principles
(nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and ntot the use of force.
(Emphasis added.) See 39 U.S. DEr'T oF STATE, BULL. No. 1011, PUB. No. 6724,
at 721-22 (Nov. 10, 1958).
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Chinese compliance with respect to agreements concluded by parties
of unequal strength and primarily for the benefit of the weaker partyweaker because it lacks effective government protection in the face
of Japan's nonrecognition policy towards Peking.
With respect to the right and duty of states to negotiate and
conclude fisheries agreements, the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas provides:
Article 4. If the nationals of two or more States are
engaged in fishing the same stock or stocks of fish or other
living marine resources in any area or areas of the high seas,
these States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into
negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement for their
nationals the necessary measures for the conservation of the
living resources affected.
Article 6. (1) A coastal State has a special interest in
the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in
any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea.
(2) A coastal State is entitled to take part on an equal
footing in any system of research and regulation for purpose
of conservation of the living resources of the high seas in
that area, even though its nationals do not carry on fishing
there.
(3) A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing in
any area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a
State shall, at the request of that coastal State, enter into
negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement the
measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area ....
Article 7 enables a coastal state to take unilateral measures of
conservation upon fulfilling certain requirements, if negotiations with
other states have not led to an agreement within six months.
It may be noted that fisheries agreements are usually concluded
between states which have recognized each other.82 Since the PRC
812 U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFiciAL RECORD 139-41, U.N.

Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.54 (1958).
82 This is necessarily implied in articles 4 and 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention,
supra note 81. Nonrecognition "results in treating as non-existent the legislative,
judicial and administrative acts of the State whose government has been refused
recognition; it entails in many cases the suspension of the operation of treaties concluded by former governments." H. LAUTERPACET, RECoGNrrIoN IN INTERNATIONAL
Even though conclusion of a treaty does not necessarily imply
LAW 4-5 (1947).
recognition, id. at 375; T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF REcoGNrTMON 193
(1951), an unrecognized government is not obliged to enter into a treaty intended
primarily for the benefit of the state which denies it recognition. It is for that state
to weigh whether the price paid for withholding recognition is unduly high, and must
reap the consequences accordingly. Thus, despite the urgent need for a fisheries
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has not been recognized by Japan and has not signed the 1958 Geneva
Convention, there was no legal duty on its part to conclude a fisheries
agreement with Japan.83
Just as ambassadorial talks were used as a substitute for normal
diplomatic channels between Washington and Peking, agreements between fisheries associations were utilized to take the place of fisheries
treaties between Japan and the PRC. While the agreements are consistent with the Bandung spirit of friendly relations and peaceful coexistence, Japan had an additional and more important reason for
seeking a fisheries agreement. Between 1950 and 1954, a period of
tension heightened by the Korean War and military activities in the
Taiwan Strait, the PRC detained 158 Japanese fishing vessels and
1,909 crewmen under the charges of espionage and other illegal
activities. Fifty-four vessels and all the crewmen (except 17 who died
during captivity) were later returned to Japan. However, the desire to
obtain the release of the remaining vessels and to prevent future
incidents, as well as the need to regularize fishing activities off the
China coast in the face of growing Chinese interest in developing their
own fisheries resources, led to the conclusion of the fisheries agreement
on April 15, 1955. This Agreement, between the Chinese Fisheries
Association (CFA) and the Japan-China Fisheries Association
(JCFA), concerning Fisheries on the Yellow Sea and the Eastern
Sea, contained the following major provisions: '
(a) Six fishing zones were delineated in which fishing during
specified seasons by a maximum number of vessels of each party was
permitted. (Article 2.) In view of China's claim of a 12-mile terriagreement between Japan and South Korea (which has reportedly seized 146 Japanese

fishing vessels and 1,776 crewmen for alleged violations of the "Rhee Line," G.
BORGSTROM, JAPAN's WORLD SuccEss IN FISHING 30 (1964)), a fisheries agreement
was not concluded until December, 1965, immediately following the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two countries.
83The importance of fisheries industries to Japan cannot be overemphasized.
Its marine products, for example, furnish almost two-thirds of the proteins consumed
by Japanese people. NIPPON: A CHARTER SuRvEy OF JAPAN 136 (1966).
As
of September, 1966, the number of people employed in fisheries, agriculture and
related jobs numbered 620,000 (of whom 480,000 are males), out of a total of
49,180,000 (of whom 29,390,000 are males) employed in all industries. JAPAN BuREAU OF STATISTICS, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MONTHLY STATISTICS OF
JAPAN, No. 65, at 8 (Nov., 1966). Yet, although it is the world's leading fishing
nation, Japan, to meet its growing demand, must still import fish not only from
neighboring South Korea, Russia and Taiwan, but from more remote nations like
Peru, Mexico, Spain and Australia as well. Japanese fish imports amounted to

$7,700,000 in 1959, but jumped to $160,000,000 in 1966 and are expected to reach
$200,000,000 in 1967. Asahi Evening News, Feb. 3, 1967, at 7, col. 3. At the same
time, however, Japan's own fish catches have leveled off sharply, due to attrition
of marine resources, the gradual tightening of controls imposed by other countries on
Japan's pelagic fishery and pollution of fishing grounds by waterfront industrial
plants. Its total catch in 1965 was 6,880,000 tons, or only 20,000 tons more than in
1962. Id.; NIPPON: A CHARTER SURvEY OF JAPAN 136 (1966).
844 PRC TaRATY SEIS 265.

1967]
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torial limit, these zones begin from 13 to 80 miles, or an average of
50-60 miles, off the coast of China.
(b) In the interest of safety and orderliness at sea, in addition to
international custom on navigation, vessels of both parties must
observe specified rules concerning identification, signaling, anchoring,
netting and the keeping of minimum distance between vessels and
maximum speed. (Article 3.)
(c) Both parties must render mutual assistance in case of untoward incidents, natural disaster or serious injury or illness of crewmen. (Article 4(1).)
(d) In case of emergency (defined as serious injury other than
epidemics, serious damage to engines or ship's body, serious leaking in
ship's hull and a hurricane or storm), Chinese vessels may enter three
designated ports in Japan and Japanese vessels may enter three designated ports in China for limited duration upon notification to appropriate local authorities and compliance with certain rules. Among the
rules is one requiring compliance with local laws prohibiting use of
wireless communication, disembarkation without permission and investigation or recording of atmospheric conditions, depth of waters or
anything unconnected with fishing activities. Local fisheries associations or other appropriate bodies shall assist these vessels, to the best
of their ability, in their requests for food, water, medicine or other
necessities. (Article 4(2).)
(e) In the interests of conservation and development of fishing
resources, the two associations shall exchange information and materials on research, statistics and technical equipment. (Article 5.)
(f) Upon receiving evidence that the number of vessels in a
fishing zone exceeds that allotted to a party under the present agreement, vessels of the other party shall report such violation to their own
association which shall forward such information to the other association. The latter shall take appropriate measures against the delinquent vessels and report back on measures taken. (Article 6(1).)
(g) Disputes involving vessels of both parties should, if at all
possible, be settled on the spot. Only after the failure of such a settlement should: the disputes be referred to their respective associations
for resolution. (Article 6(2).)
(h) If a violation of Article 3 of this agreement (safety rules)
results in damages, both vessels shall report the incident to their
respective associations for investigation and settlement.
(Article
6(3).)
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(Article 11.)

(j) Both parties shall urge their respective Governments to enter
into negotiations for a fisheries treaty with a view to settling speedily
the Sino-Japanese fisheries question. (Article 9.)
Under an exchange of notes on the same date," the CFA informed
the JCFA of the establishment of four zones: (a) the Military Alert
Zone in the north (connecting the eastern base of the Liaotung
Peninsula to the tip of the Shantung Peninsula) which Japanese fishing
vessels may not enter without special permission; (b) the Military
Prohibited Navigation Zone (around the mouth of the Ch'ien-t'ang
River) to which Japanese vessels are barred; (c) the Military Activity
Zone in the south (encompassing Taiwan and its environs) which
Japanese vessels may enter only at their own risk; and (d) the MotorTrawler Forbidden Zone (connecting the Military Alert Zone to the
Military Activity Zone) which both Chinese and Japanese motortrawlers are prohibited to enter.
The Japanese acquiesced in the first two zones on the understanding that their establishment would not result in discrimination
against Japan. With respect to the third zone, the Japanese recognized the spirit of the advice and undertook to inform Japanese vessels
accordingly. Concerning the fourth zone, although the Japanese recognized that the internal law of a country could not apply to the high
seas so as to restrict the rights of other countries, they nevertheless
accepted the spirit which motivated the Chinese Government to prohibit fishing by motor-trawlers within the zone, and promised voluntarily to forbid Japanese vessels to fish therein."8
The agreement was successively renewed until the Nagasaki Flag
Incident of May 2, 1958 8 caused a deterioration in Sino-Japanese
relations. Four days after the incident, the CFA protested to JCFA
Between May
against alleged violations of the Fisheries Agreement.'
6th and 13th, sixteen Japanese fishing vessels with 194 crew members
were captured in the southwestern part of the Eastern Sea for allegedly
intruding into a prohibited fishing area and the Military Activity Zone.
Through the intercession of JCFA and the Japan-China Friendship
Association, all but four vessels and two crewmen were subsequently
85 Id. at 276.
86 Letter from JCFA to CFA, April 15, 1955, in 2 JiH-PEN WEN-T'I WEN-cHIEN

HUI-PIEN (Collection of Documents on the Japanese Question) 239 (1958).
S 7 In this incident a flag of the PRC on display at a fair in Nagasaki was insulted by Japanese who were later punished by imposition of a Y.500 fine. 2 JiH-PEN
WEN-r'I WEN-CHIEN HUI-PIEN, supra note 86, at 214. See also 3 id. at 43.
88
Protest cable from CFA to JCFA, May 6, 1958, in 2 id. at 245. See also
JEx-miN JIH-PAo, May 7, 1958, at 5.
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released by the Shanghai Security Bureau, but all attempts by JCFA
to renew the agreement failed. On June 11, 1958, one day before
the expiration of the agreement, JCFA expressed its regret to CFA
concerning the impending termination of the agreement. It described
the implementation of the twice-renewed agreement as "healthful and
completely satisfactory," and as having contributed to the friendly
and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries. Despite
the expiration of the agreement, JCFA pledged to continue to request
the Japanese Government to establish normal relations with the PRC
and, on its own part, to strictly supervise the activities of Japanese
fishing vessels in conformity with the letter and spirit of the fisheries
agreement, expressing hope that a fisheries agreement would be concluded before long. 9
Although the decision of JCFA to comply unilaterally with the
letter and spirit of the expired fisheries agreement had much to do with
arresting a further deterioration of Sino-Japanese fisheries relations,
it could not have accomplished the task alone. China, as the coastal
state, could have imposed drastic restrictions on Japanese fishermen.
Such emergency measures as those relating to rescues or shelter in
Chinese ports must perforce depend on Chinese cooperation and participation. With the lapse of the fisheries agreement and in the face
of continued diplomatic non-recognition, what avenues were left for
fisheries cooperation between the two countries?
Further ingenuity and improvisation was required. In 1959,
while attending the 10th anniversary celebration of the founding of the
PRC, the visiting Japanese delegation came to an understanding with
Chinese officials on the basis of which an agreement providing for
emergency rescue of and shelter for fishing vessels was signed between
the Chinese People's Foreign Cultural Association and the JapanChina Friendship Association. The two associations worked towards
further measures for preventing and settling disputes. They even went
beyond the old agreement by organizing an exchange of visits between
Chinese and Japanese fishermen. This emergency agreement was
finally superseded by the 1963 Fisheries Agreement."
The 1963 Fisheries Agreement was born of improved SinoJapanese relations and followed closely upon the signing of the LiaoTakasaki Trade Memorandum of November 9, 1962.91 It was similar
to the 1955 agreement, except:
So Information obtained from annual business reports issued in Japanese by JCFA.
90 See joint declaration by five Chinese and Japanese organizations on the signing
of the Sino-Japanese civil fisheries agreement, Nov. 9, 1963, in 5 JIH-PEN WF--T'i
Wma-crI. Hui-PiE:N, mnpra note 86, at 125.
9
O See text accompanying notes 97-121 infra.
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(a) The numbers of Chinese fishing vessels permitted to enter
two of the six zones (Zones 3 and 6) were raised to the same levels as
those for the Japanese, perhaps indicating expanded fishing activity
on the part of China.
(b) Fishing vessels of one party could also enter the ports of
the other under the emergency entry rule of Article 4(2) if they were
escorting a rescued crew or vessel.
(c) The number of Chinese ports in which Japanese fishing
vessels could seek shelter was reduced from three to two, with the
maximum number of vessels specified as 50 for Wu-sung and 30 for
Lien-yun. (Article 4(2).)
(d) A more detailed method of communication between fishing
vessels and port authorities was provided in the 1963 agreement.
(e) Exchange of fisheries experts and technicians was added to
the exchange program under Article 5.
(f) The duration of the agreement was increased from one to
two years. (Article 11.) 92
Any attempt to evaluate Chinese compliance in regard to these
fisheries agreements must take into account the fact that thousands of
vessels are engaged in fishing off China's coast every year and hundreds
are in the six specified zones alone. Violations and disputes invariably
occur from time to time. The problem is multiplied by the small size
of these vessels (most of which are below 100 tons) and by language
barriers. The following observations may nevertheless be made, based
on personal interviews with officials of JCFA and the Japanese Foreign
Office as well as an exhaustive study of JCFA reports through
the years.
A few incidents may be described to illustrate the type of problems involved and Chinese attitudes toward them:
After a collision between the Japanese fishing vessel Manzan
Maru and the Chinese fishing vessel Shantung No. 14, on December
16, 1962, the former rescued all the Chinese crew and began to tow
the Chinese vessel to port. In the course of the towing, the Chinese
vessel sank. The Japanese captain admitted that, contrary to regulations which required two men on the watch, there was only one man
on watch at the time of the collision. The Chinese admitted that at
9212 PRC TREATY SmuEs 254.

Under the new Agreement and related exchange

of notes signed in Peking on December 17, 1965, the following changes have been
made in the 1963 Agreement: (a) The areas covered by Zones 1 and 2 have been
slightly changed; (b) A special conservation zone has been created in which each
country is limited to sending 80 vessels during four months every year; and (c) Provision has been made to protect young fish and to regulate th& size of dragnet meshes.

1967]

TREATY RELATIONS OF PRC

the time of the original collision, although their vessel was stationary,
it carried a light signalling that it was moving, thus misleading the
Japanese vessel. The Chinese expressed appreciation for the action
taken by the Japanese vessel after the collision and, indicating that the
question of compensation was not as important as the maintenance of
friendly relations with the Japanese, decided to share the responsibility
and the damages."
In another incident, a Japanese crewman on board No. 62 Fukuho
Maru suffered an injury as a result of firing from a Chinese vessel.
The expenses incurred for his hospitalization and treatment in Japan
formed the subject of negotiations between the CFA and JCFA. The
Chinese stated that they had imposed penalties upon the Chinese vessel
and its captain for violating rules prohibiting firing at unarmed fishing
vessels. However, they disclaimed external financial liability on the
ground that the firing occurred when the Japanese vessel was attempting to flee from the scene. The CFA did send "condolences" to the
Japanese crewman, which included a gift of an unspecified sum of
money.94
It may be noted that incidents of collision and destruction or
damage of fishing gear usually result in losses to the Chinese rather
than to the Japanese, because Japanese vessels are usually made
of steel, are of the ocean-going type of 85, 89 or 99 tons and possess
stronger and newer fishing equipment, whereas the Chinese fishing
fleet consists of many small fishing junks capable of operating on
coastal waters only. In many such incidents, the JCFA, upon establishing its responsibility after investigation, would impose fines upon
the guilty or suspend the captains' or vessels' licenses to operate in the
fishing zones for specified periods of time, and pay for the damage
caused to the Chinese side.
Article 6(2) of both the 1955 and 1963 fisheries agreements calls
for on-the-spot settlement of disputes wherever possible; many disputes
have indeed been so resolved. According to an official JCFA report
concerning the settlement of fifteen incidents involving Chinese and
Japanese fishing vessels between November, 1958, and March, 1959a period when no fisheries agreement was in force--the Chinese were
characterized by the Japanese as having expeditious ways of resolving
disputes on the spot. Eight of the incidents involved compensation for
damages caused to Chinese nets, ropes and buoys. The Chinese attitudes on these occasions were described by JCFA as "generally
93 JCFA, REcoRDs OF THE SECOm CONFERENcE
FIsHERIEs AGRE
sMETS,
NOVmmER-DEcEmER, 1965,
Japanese).
Id. at 121.

ON THE NEv JAPAN-CHINA
PEKING 147 (1966)
(text in

280

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.lI6:244

friendly." JCFA believed that, given a "sincere Japanese attitude
towards negotiation," conflicts could be avoided. 5
Considerable disagreement exists, however, over Chinese charges
of espionage activities by Japanese fishing vessels. JCFA believed that
such incidents were largely the result of misunderstanding. For
example, two Japanese fishing vessels-Himeshima Marn and Mishima
Maru-were confiscated in Shanghai on the ground that they were
engaged in military espionage. According to a statement by one of
the crewmen who returned to Japan, the captains of the two vessels
incurred Chinese suspicion when they threw the log books into the
water while the vessels were detained in the port of Shanghai. The
log books were subsequently retrieved by the Chinese and the captain
and the radio operator of the Himeshima Mara were sentenced to four
and three years of forced labor respectively by a Shanghai court on
October 31, 1958. Both were released after one year through the
good offices of the Chinese Red Cross and the Japan-China Friendship
Association.
The captains of the 5th and 8th Showa Maru aroused Chinese
suspicion when, according to the report of one of the returned crewmen,
they burned their fishery diaries and a radio operator burned his communication record. According to other crewmen, some Japanese
vessels did intrude into the prohibited areas to take measurements of
the depth of the sea bottom in violation of the fisheries agreements. A
code book compiled by the Japanese Trawler Association for use by
trawlers in order to avoid capture by Korean naval vessels for violations of the "Rhee Line," was mistaken by the Chinese for a military
intelligence code. Certain fishing vessels appointed by the Japanese
Meteorological Society to report back information on weather conditions in its own code and some companies using abbreviated codes
in communicating with their vessels have also been viewed with suspicion by the Chinese. Finally, some fishermen carried with them
binoculars or cameras, which the Chinese considered to be evidence of
intelligence operations. In the end, JCFA instructed all relevant bodies
to desist from any activity which might even remotely lend itself to
suspicion by the Chinese authorities."
As a final observation, it is noteworthy that in its 1966 petition
to the Japanese Foreign Office for normalizing Sino-Japanese fisheries
relations, JCFA pointed out that of the 109 Japanese fishing vessels
still detained in China, 104 were captured between 1950 and 1954,
and five were confiscated in 1958-all periods when no fisheries
agreement was in force.
95 See note 89 supra.
06 Id.
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E. Trade Agreements
1. Japan
Despite Japan's continued recognition of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and close military, political and economic ties with
the United States, its trade volume with mainland China reached an
all-time high of $621 million in 1966 (a 32 per cent increase over the
preceding year) and is now second in size only to Japanese trade with
the United States. By contrast, its trade with Taiwan remained about
$300 million for 196607
Moreover, notwithstanding the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which Japanese sources expected to settle down around the
summer of 1967,' the volume of both-way trade for 1967 was still
expected to increase by 10 per cent over that of 1966, reaching around
$700 million. 9 Indeed, it has been predicted that total trade will reach
$1,000 million within a few years,0 0 despite the many political and
economic vagaries to which Sino-Japanese trade is subject. Not the
least of these is the tendency of the Coordinating Committee for Export
Control to ease control on exports to Russia and Eastern Europe,
while tightening controls against mainland China.'
The continued growth of Sino-Japanese trade may be attributed
to the complementary nature of the trade and the geographical propinquity of the two countries. China's exports to Japan consist largely of
agricultural produce and raw materials, while Japan's exports to China
consist mainly of chemical fertilizers, steel and machinery. As early
as 1955, Peking's Vice Minister for Foreign Trade, Lei Jen-min,
underscored the geographic element when he cited the fact that it
took only two days to reach Nagasaki from Shanghai and four days
to cover the distance between Tientsin and Kobe. Transportation for
07
This "Great Leap Forward" in Japan-mainland China trade may be seen from
the following table:

RECENT SiNO-JAPANESE TRADE VoLumEs

(Monetary Unit-$1,000)
Year
Exports
Imports
Total
1960
2,726
20,729
23,455
1961
16,639
30,895
47,534
1962
38,457
46,020
84,477
1963
62,417
74,599
137,016
1964
152,739
157,750
310,489
1965
245,036
224,705
469,741
621,000 a
306,000 a
315,000 a
1966
(Note: a = approximate)
Unpublished statistics compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Dec. 1966.
98 Japan Times, Jan. 27, 1967, at 8, col. 1.
99 Japan Times, Jan. 29, 1967, at 10, col. 1.
loo Japan Times Weekly, Nov. 12, 1966, at 7, col. 1.
1l Japan Times, Dec. 30, 1966, at 8, col. 1.

282

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l16:244

one ton of coal from the United States to Japan, he said, cost $17,
whereas that from China to Japan cost only about $3."'2

Although

these figures may have changed since then, the basic factor remains the
same. Along with racial, cultural and historical affinities, these factors
could not help but incline the two countries to a close economic
relationship.
There are interesting parallels between the Sino-Japanese fisheries
agreements and the trade agreements. Both have been concluded on
the Associational instead of the Governmental level and both are
regarded as unofficial by Japan, but considered to be semi-official
by the PRC, which includes the texts in its Treaty Series. Moreover,
both were affected by the Nagasaki Flag Incident in 1958 and recovered almost simultaneously in 1963.
Almost all Sino-Japanese trade transactions currently are channeled through the Liao-Takasaki and friendly-firm arrangements. The
background and character of each of these agreements will be briefly
described.
From 1952 to 1958, Sino-Japanese trade was conducted through
four different trade agreements subject to renewal.Y3 These trade
agreements aimed at an annual export-import balance in specified
categories of commodities, with the maximum volumes each way varying between £30 million and £35 million per year. In the event of a
dispute over the terms of the agreements, recourse would be had to
arbitration. The first two agreements named China as the place for
arbitration, with an arbitration commission to be composed of members from both countries; the last two specified the defendant state as
the place for arbitration and also provided for a mutually acceptable
third-party arbitrator to serve in the commission. Because of trade
embargoes during the Korean War, the maximum trade volumes were
far from being reached. Thus, despite the June, 1952 trade agreement,
which set the maximum both-way trade volume at £60 million, actual
volume reached only 5.5 per cent of that figure, or a quarter of the
1950 trade volume. Only 38.8 per cent of the trade target set under
the October, 1953 agreement was reached, with China's exports to
Japan doubling Japan's exports to China. Under the third agreement
of May, 1955, China's exports to Japan reached 78 per cent of the
target as compared to Japan's exports which reached only 30 per cent.'0 4
Under Article 10 of the third trade agreement, each side could
establish a resident trade mission in the capital of the other side. The
1022 JIH-PEN WEm-Ti WEN-CHIEN HUI-PIEN, supra note 86, at 171-72.
103 Texts of these agreements are in 2 PRC TREATY Sna s 367, 368;

Tsn ATY SEams 258; 7 PRC TREAT'Y SRIEs 197.
104 2 Jm-PEN WEw-T'i WEN-cHmN Hui-Pimx, supra note 86, at 171-72.
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mission and its personnel would be accorded "diplomatic" immunities.
Under Article 2 of the same agreement, both sides pledged to work
towards an early fulfillment of these provisions, as well as to urge
their Governments to negotiate and conclude a commercial treaty at
the earliest possible date. These provisions, however, apparently
sowed the seeds of disharmony between the two countries. The
Japanese Government, although welcoming increased trade with the
PRC, was nevertheless politically committed to recognition of the
Nationalist Government and to a pro-United States policy. It insisted
that any Chinese trade personnel residing in Japan for a period longer
than two months must fulfill a fingerprinting requirement which was
viewed as humiliating by Peking."°5 This and other obstacles prevented the exchange of trade missions, as well as the holding of
Chinese trade fairs in Nagoya and Fukuoka in 1957.
Following a visit to Peking by a Japanese trade delegation in the
fall of 1957, the fourth trade agreement was signed on March 5, 1958.
This agreement omitted the controversial "diplomatic" provision.
Instead, under a separate memorandum regarded as an integral part
of the agreement, trade missions and their personnel were to be
accorded freedom of travel and communication, including the right to
use codes, the right to display national flags on their buildings and
exemption from fingerprinting. Procedures for the settlement of
disputes by joint agreement also were included. The Japanese Government, however, adamantly refused to agree to the flag privilege in view
of its diplomatic recognition of the Nationalist Government. In the
midst of this controversy, there occurred the Nagasaki Flag Incident,'0 0
which prematurely terminated the 1958 agreement. Also terminated
were negotiations by two Chinese mining corporations for the purchase
The two corporations had entered
of 158,000 tons of steel in Japan.'
into a five-year agreement on February 26, 1958 with Japanese metal
representatives for the trading of Chinese iron and coal products for
Japanese steel products. The export volume from each side for the
five-year period had been set at i100 million.'ws
During the trade interruption, Peking laid down a number of preconditions for resumption of trade with Japan, including three political
preconditions: abandonment of any anti-Chinese policy, nonparticipation in a "two-China" scheme, and nonfrustration of normal relations
between China and Japan; '1 three concerning trade channels: govern105

See Editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao, Aug. 7, 1957, at 7.
O See note 87 supra.
107 2 J3m-Ip
WEN-T'I WEN-cHIEN HuI-PiEN, supra note 86, at 213.
10 Id. at 185-87.
109 3 id. at 57.
10
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mental agreements, nongovernmental contracts and individual contacts; and adherence to the principle of nonseparation of politics from
economics."
On September 19, 1962, at a farewell party given in Peking by
Mr. Matsumura, a Diet member and adviser of the Liberal Democratic
Party, Premier Chou reiterated the above preconditions as guiding
principles for Sino-Japanese trade. However, he also indicated that
these preconditions constituted only long-term objectives and that
trade could resume on a gradual basis beginning from the people's
level."' The Matsumura visit was soon followed by that of former
Minister of Trade Takasaki, resulting in the Liao-Takasaki Memorandum of November 9, 1962.112 Under this memorandum, a five-year
trade plan (1963-1967) was mapped with an average volume of ;36
China would export coal, iron ore,
million per year. (Article 1.)
soy beans, maize, mixed beans, salt and tin, while Japan would export
steel (including special steel), chemical fertilizers, agricultural medicines, agricultural machines and implements and factories. (Article
Each transaction under the memorandum was to be consum2.)
mated by separate contracts between Japanese concerns and one of
the PRC's foreign trade corporations. (Article 3.) Both sides agreed
to promote technical exchange and cooperation. (Article 6.)
Unlike the four trade agreements concluded between 1952 and
1958, the present memorandum did not provide for methods of arbitration, which must form the subject of a separate agreement.
(Article 7.)
The bottleneck which prevents a much greater trade volume lies
in Article 5, which requires the conclusion of separate agreements for
long-term credits or installment payments, both of which are under
rigid Japanese government control. The effect of Article 5 thus has
been to deny the PRC such credits or installment payments.
Under the five-year memorandum, an annual agreement must be
concluded separately to fix the volume of trade as well as the price,
quantity and quality of each commodity to be transacted for in each
particular year. The terms of these annual agreements are not made
public, although their general contents may be ascertained through
monthly publications of trade statistics by the Japanese Ministry of
Finance.
A close balance between exports and imports in specified categories
of goods is sought. For example, the sales volume of Japanese steel
or iron to China is geared to the volume of Japanese purchases of pig
110 Id. at 135.
"'4 id. at 17-19.
112 Id. at 90.
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iron from China, and Chinese purchases of Japanese fertilizers are tied
to Japanese purchases of Chinese rice. After the target has been set,
experts from both sides are to decide on the quantity and price of each
item. Firms are nominated by both sides, largely on the basis of their
past reputation. Increasingly, however, the Chinese have taken the
initiative in these nominations. Negotiation with Japanese firms on
specific items is conducted by one of the state-owned export-import
corporations headquartered in Peking, assisted by the Liao office.
These corporations are in turn under the over-all coordination and
supervision of the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade. Payments are based on the pound sterling through London.
Under a separate memorandum of April 19, 1964, agreement was
reached on the establishment of a Takasaki Liaison Office in Peking and
a Liao Chen-chih Liaison Office in Tokyo. Each side could temporarily
appoint three representatives and two staff members to its office for
one year's duration, with each assuming responsibility for the safety of
the other side's personnel, as well as for handling their entry
procedures. The personnel of both sides were to arrive in their offices
by the middle of June, 1964."' It should be noted that conspicuously
omitted from this memorandum was the right of the offices to display
national flags-a source of much controversy heretofore.
In addition to trading under the L-T agreements, a considerable
number of transactions have been consummated through what has
become known as "friendly firms." Some friendly firms also take part
in L-T trade, and some of the items within the L-T targets may also be
the subject of transactions by friendly firms, which engage in more
items of trade than L-T. These firms, after being found acceptable to
Peking, usually send representatives to visit the semiannual trade fairs
in Canton. There, along with traders and manufacturers from other
nations, they close many deals with Peking."' The lapse of trade
agreements between 1958 and 1963 due to the Nagasaki Flag Incident
also resulted in the absence of Japanese participation in the Canton fairs
during that period.
The proportion of trade concluded by L-T and friendly firms since
1963 may be seen from the following table: ...
11313 PRC TREATY SERmS 386.

114 The Canton fair was first begun in the spring of 1957, the twenty-first fair
being held on April 15, 1967, for a one-month period, notwithstanding the Cultural
Revolution. At least 250 Japanese business firms and more than 800 of their representatives planned to participate in this fair, as compared to 230 firms and 750 representatives participating in the autumn fair held in October, 1966. Japan Times, Jan. 29,
1967, at 10, col. 3. This increase amidst the Cultural Revolution is most impressive in
view of the fact that spring fairs in Canton are usually smaller in scale than the
autumn ones.
115 Statistics supplied by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo in
December, 1966.
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Year
1963
1964
1965
1966

L-T Trade
47%
37%
36%
33%

[Vol.l16:244

Friendly Firms
53%
63%
64%
67%

The table reveals that the share of L-T trade in the total volume
decreased with the passage of time, while that of friendly firms increased. Thus, for the fifth year of the L-T agreement, the absolute
sum of L-T trade is expected to decrease from $204 million in 1966
to $184 million in 1967 (roughly $84 million of imports from China to
Japan and $100 million of exports from Japan to China), chiefly due
to a cut in Japan's importation of Chinese rice from 300,000 tons to
200,000 tons. The friendly firms' share, on the other hand, is expected to go up not only in absolute terms, but also proportionally, in
view of expected increases in the total trade volume to about $700
million for 1967 from $621 million for 1966. Such a trend may be
explained in part by the stronger bargaining position which Peking
holds vis-a-vis individual friendly firms than under the L-T trade.
Furthermore, by awarding contracts selectively and strategically, China
can reap a political as well as an economic harvest.
In addition, one may note with interest a change in the balance
of trade in recent years. Unlike the 1952-1958 period, in which
China's exports to Japan far exceeded Japan's exports to China as a
result of the trade embargo policy, trade statistics in the last few years
reveal a reverse trend; in 1965, exports from Japan to China amounted
to $245 million as compared to $224 million worth of Japanese imports
from China. Between January and June of 1966, exports from Japan
to China amounted to $164 million, while imports from China to Japan
were $156 million." 6
On the question of Chinese compliance with the various trade
agreements and contracts with friendly firms, it is unanimously conceded that the Chinese have always met their financial obligations
promptly. Indeed, China has an excellent international credit rating,
based on its payment of debts to the Soviet Union and its meeting of
Disobligations for wheat purchased from Canada and Australia."
putes "very rarely" occur, whether over the quality of the commodities
or other terms of the agreements. Should disagreement arise, it is
invariably settled by negotiation and conciliation rather than arbitra116 Statistics supplied by an official of a "friendly firm" in Tokyo, in December,
1966.
"7 Japan Times Weekly, Nov. 12, 1966, at 7, col. 2.
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tion,"-~ and the Chinese position has, on the whole, been represented
to the author as one of reasonableness and understanding.
The abrupt cancellation of the 1958 trade agreement may have
been justified. It can be argued that the Japanese government had
frustrated the carrying out of substantive provisions of this agreement
by putting obstacles in the way of the establishment of a Chinese trade
mission in Japan, and by denying the mission's right to display the
Chinese flag. These rights had been assured in the agreement, a
Japanese negotiator having interrupted a session in order to return
home for consultation with the Japanese government before agreeing
to them.11
During the current turmoil wrought by the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution, congestion in Shanghai and other Chinese ports
has resulted in delay in the loading and unloading of ships. In one
instance, a Japanese ship had to remain in port for twenty days before
the loading and unloading work was completed, as compared with the
two or three days required in normal times.' ° Whether or not these
delays resulting from Red Guard activities may be considered as
force majeure, like labor strikes, is not clear at this writing. It may
be noted that such delays occur more often with Japanese vessels than
those of other nationalities, because contracts involving the former do
not usually contain a demurrage clause. As a result, Japanese vessels
are often serviced last during periods of port congestion or labor
shortage.
When Japanese workers and technicians are sent to China in
fulfillment of an agreement or contract, they are generally quartered
in places segregated from the Chinese people, in part for reasons of
convenience. They must obtain prior permission to travel, but such
permission has been given quite freely. No incident or dispute between
them and the Chinese people or authorities has been reported.
Occasionally, the Chinese may time the announcement of trade
transactions with Japan in such a way as to gain maximum propaganda
effect. For example, transactions with friendly firms involving $50
million worth of goods had been agreed upon in Peking prior to the
1966 autumn fair in Canton. However, the actual signing was postponed until the holding of the Canton fair, probably to enable Peking
to claim that a total of $130 million worth of transactions had been
consummated in Canton, instead of only $80 million. This had the
effect of accentuating the importance of the fair, although the $130
million figure was technically correct.
1 8 See text accompanying note 148 infra.
Hui-P EN, supra note 86, at 184.
1192 Jia-PEx WF-T' WEN-cmH-E
120 Japan Times, Jan. 29, 1967, at 10, col. 1.
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One of course may question the appropriateness of international
trading on a "friendly firm" basis. There is perhaps only a difference
of degree between this and various other state practices. Thus, the
state-owned Central Trust of China, Nationalist China's official purchasing agency, recently announced that the Nationalist Government
had canceled a contract for the purchase of 333 tractors from two
Japanese firms. A Tokyo report said a visit to mainland China by the
board chairman of one of the firms in December, 1966, might have
jeopardized the deal.'" The Trust's spokesman explained: "It is our
persistent policy to have no dealings with Japanese firms which do
business with Chinese Communists."
2. Canada
During the late nineteen fifties natural calamities, accentuated by
economic dislocations resulting from the Great Leap Forward and the
communes, made necessary China's massive importation of food.
Russia, which was already withdrawing its technical and economic
assistance from China-the first visible impact of an ever-widening
ideological cleavage-was in no mood to alleviate China's food
shortages. China was forced to turn to Western countries and found
receptive sellers in Canada, Australia, Argentina and France. For
the purpose of this study, it suffices to concentrate on her dealings with
Canada. Despite the vast geographical, racial, historical, cultural,
religious, political and economic differences between Japan and Canada,
their relations with China are marked by great similarities: both engaged in substantial trade with the PRC despite official nonrecognition;
both experienced meticulous Chinese compliance with trade agreements
or contracts.
Unlike the Sino-Japanese essentially balanced multi-commodity
trade, however, Sino-Canadian trade has been characterized by a oneway wheat-barley sale from Canada to China. Also, while China includes its trade agreements with various nonofficial Japanese bodies in
its Treaty Series (persuasive evidence that these were given a semiofficial status), it has refrained from including its agreements with
Canada therein, probably because these agreements have been concluded on the Chinese Corporational level instead of on the Associational level as in the case of Japan. Although the precise implications of this difference are not known, the Canadian agreements are
included in the present study for comparative purposes.
In January, 1961, a large sale was negotiated between the PRC
and Canada, consisting of 750,000 long tons of wheat and 260,000
121 Japan Times, Jan. 26, 1967, at 12, col. 6.
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long tons of barley. Later, a second sales contract was signed for
60,000 long tons of wheat. Both sales were for cash, and prompt shipment was made at China's request." 2 In April, 1961, a long-term
agreement, covering the period from June 1, 1961, to December 31,
1963, was concluded following negotiations in Hong Kong and Peking.
In this agreement, Peking declared its intent to purchase a maximum of
five million long tons of wheat and one million long tons of barley
from Canada, with the actual quantities and prices to be decided by
subsequent negotiations which since have been conducted on the average
of about twice a year.
Pursuant to this umbrella agreement, a sales contract was signed
involving 750,000 long tons of wheat and 360,000 long tons of barley.
A deferred payment was arranged to allow Peking to pay 25 per cent
in cash at the time of loading and the balance nine months thereafter.
Payments were in pounds sterling through London. Subsequent to
this, another sales contract was signed involving 160,000 long tons
of wheat for shipment from St. Lawrence ports, with a similar deferred
payments arrangement. The above contracts alone involved a total
of 64.2 million bushels of wheat and 28.9 million bushels of barley. 2
Since these initial contracts, the "wheat deal" between Canada and
China has become a regular feature of international trade. Out of
some 174 million bushels of wheat imported by China for the crop
year 1963-1964,' 4 Canada supplied 41,286,001 bushels." = Canada's
sales in 1964-1965 increased in both absolute sum and percentage: it
supplied 62,370,202 bushels out of a total of 222 million bushels imported by China, which made China the second largest wheat customer
of Canada after the United Kingdom. 2 In the 1965-1966 crop year,
about 80 million bushels were sold to China; for 1966-1967, an
estimated 93 million bushels are scheduled to be sold. 7 The average
price is about two Canadian dollars per bushel.
Just as diplomatic nonrecognition between Japan and the PRC
necessitated the conclusion of the fisheries and trade agreements on the
Associational instead of the Governmental level, similar circumstances
in Sino-Canadian relations resulted in wheat agreements being concluded between the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and the China
Resources Corporation (CRC). The former is a Crown Agency,
122 See

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CANADIAN WHEAT
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1961, at 9.
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125 ANNUAL REPORT OF CANADIAN WHEAT BoARD,

126Id. at 10-11.
127Japan Times, Dec. 11, 1966, at 10, col. 3.
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1964-1965, at 11 (1966).
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established in 1935 by the Canadian Wheat Board Act m as an
autonomous body reporting to the Minister of Trade and Commerce.
As the sole marketing agency for wheat, oats and barley grown in
western Canada (which provides some 95 per cent of exported wheat),
it deals with some twenty to thirty large trading firms. CRC is a stateowned export-import corporation with its headquarters in Peking and
a large branch office in Hong Kong. Negotiations are conducted
directly between CWB and CRC in Hong Kong or Winnipeg,
Manitoba. In the former case, the facilities of the Canadian Trade
Commissioner in Hong Kong are used. The length of negotiations
is between two and six weeks. Occasionally, chief negotiators from
the PRC are officials of the China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation, although final signatures are
affixed by officials of CRC.
The 75 per cent deferred payment arrangement is by a "Usance
Draft" or 547-day (18-month) credit. This doubles the terms of the
1961 arrangement under which a 273-day credit was allowed. Although such drafts are usually guaranteed by the Export Credits
Insurance Corporation, thereby enabling Canadian concerns to obtain
commercial credits from banks, in the case of the China trade the
Corporation issues credits itself on the same commercial rate, probably
to avoid the possibility of any blacklisting. Transportation is usually
by Peking-chartered vessels arranged through Chinese representatives
in Vancouver.
In all these transactions, the Canadians have found Chinese payments to be punctual and, indeed, even ahead of deadlines. There has
been no complaint whatsoever by the Canadians against the Chinese
in meeting their commitments under the various agreements. Occasionally, grain loaded on the east coast of Canada is diverted to
Albania, and that loaded on the west coast to North Korea. However,
these diversions are not forbidden by the agreements.
A minor complaint raised by the Chinese but satisfactorily resolved
may be cited to illustrate the working relationship between CWB and
CRC. It involved the alleged failure of Canada to meet the Chinese
"Phyto" sanitary requirement (freedom from insects). After a
thorough investigation conducted by the Canadian Board of Grain
Commissioners, the Chinese were informed that sanitary conditions in
elevators were up to standards and that there was no evidence to
sustain charges of damage- The Chinese accepted the finding of the
closed.
Board and considered the matter
n825 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 35, at 311 (1935);
(1952).

CAN. REv. STAT.,

c. 44, at 1731-55
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3. Cuba
The inclusion of Cuba (a Latin American as well as a socialist
country) in this study is influenced not only by the need for balanced
coverage, but also by Premier Fidel Castro's denunciation of Peking
in 1966 for allegedly breaching an agreement by reducing its rice-sugar
trade with Cuba.
Cuba was the first and only Latin American country to recognize
the PRC (on September 2, 1960). In the upheavals that followed
Cuba's political and ideological realignment, it had to readjust its trade
pattern, changing from near-domination by United States trade to
close economic ties with fellow socialist countries. The transition was
difficult and the task arduous. Distance alone presented a staggering
problem; instead of crossing a mere 90-mile strait, trade now had to
be conducted from one end of the world to the other. The problem
was not made any easier by the fact that Cuba is essentially a singlecrop nation and, hence, must import a great variety and quantity of
goods. Further, its once great tourism industry had dwindled to a
trickle, and new tourists lacked the resources of the former
American ones.
It was in this setting that Cuba looked to Chinese trade and
assistance. Despite the distance between the two countries, the Cuban
need for rice and the Chinese need for sugar appeared to lay a sound
foundation for long-term trade. Indeed, a 1964 Cuban proposal to
China suggested that, since the price of sugar in China was five times
that of rice, and the price of rice in Cuba two to three times that of
sugar, a mutually beneficial exchange of two tons of Cuban sugar for
one ton of Chinese rice should be adopted."s
The first trade and payments agreement between Cuba and the
PRC was signed on July 23, 1960-even before Cuba had extended
diplomatic recognition to China. Under this agreement, China agreed
to import 500,000 tons of sugar every year over a five-year period. 130
Subsequently, a commodity exchange agreement was concluded on February 22, 1963, on the Ministry of Foreign Trade level. This agreement outlined detailed regulations covering the transport of goods by
sea and air, quality inspection, weight and measurement, payment
methods, release of obligations, penalties and arbitration. 3' On December 31, 1964, five separate agreements were concluded on the
129 Speech by Premier Fidel Castro on the 7th anniversary of the Cuban Revo-

lution, Jan. 2, 1966, in Cuban News No. 48 at 1, 9 (Cuban Embassy, Tokyo, Feb. 15,
1966) (in Japanese).
130 10 PRC TREATY SERIES 238.
13112 PRC
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subjects of trade, payments, trade for 1965, commodity exchange and
sugar sales.' 32

However, the Sino-Soviet ideological disputes had reverberations
in Cuba: vehement Chinese attacks on Soviet revisionism and foreign
policies were often published in such journals as Peking Review,
whose Spanish edition was regularly imported by the Chinese Embassy
in Havana for distribution to Cubans. To the Chinese, the importation and distribution of these materials fell properly under the government information program sanctioned by the cultural cooperation agreement of July 23, 1960."83 However, to the Cubans, who had received
much Soviet aid and who now wished to steer clear of the Sino-Soviet
dispute, these activities constituted illegitimate propaganda designed
to influence Cuban public opinion. Accordingly, the Cuban Government requested the Chinese Embassy to cease such activities in the
future, a request that did not please the Chinese.
In the midst of this dispute, in mid-November of 1965, a Cuban
delegation left for Peking to negotiate a trade agreement for 1966,
carrying with it a proposal for exports of 110 million pesos to China
and imports of 140 million pesos from China. The proposal envisaged
an increase of sugar and rice quotas over the preceding year. However,
contrary to the Cuban expectation that the 1966 quotas would at least
remain on the same level as those for 1965, the Chinese stated that they
could not agree to the importation of another 800,000 pounds of Cuban
sugar since China had harvested a big sugar crop in 1965 and had
completed repayment, in kind, of sugar loaned by the Soviet Union
in 1961. Consequently, there would be less need for Cuban sugar, as
evidenced by the abolition of sugar rationing in China. With respect
to rice, China also said she would have to reduce her exports to Cuba.
The export of 250,000 tons of rice to Cuba in 1965 was made in
response to Castro's special appeal to the Chinese Ambassador, and
could not be taken as a normal volume. Despite good rice crops in
1965, China could not send to Cuba more than 135,000 tons of rice,
the same amount she had sent in 1964, in view of the necessity of
stockpiling rice against possible American attacks, of sending rice to
help the Vietnamese and of exporting rice in order to obtain hard
currencies with which to pay for grains imported from capitalist
countries.

In a speech delivered on January 2, 1966, Premier Castro denounced China's decision to halve its rice export to Cuba at a time
when Cuba was unable to obtain rice from other countries because
132

See JEN-MIN SEEou-Ts'E; (People's Handbook) 227 (1965).

13 10 PRC TnATY SmuEs 388.
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of "American imperialism." He said that while the Chinese thought
that the 1965 arrangement was for only one year, "frankly speaking, I
thought the agreement was for a longer period." '"
While one might dispute China's professed reasons for reducing
the rice-sugar trade with Cuba, it would be difficult to find any evidence
of Chinese violation of an agreement with Cuba in light of the fact
that the agreement in question was the subject of negotiations which
had yet to be concluded. What was at issue appeared to be not the
breach of an agreement, but the failure to reach a mutually satisfactory one.
4. The Scandinavian Countries
Finland was the first non-Communist country to conclude a trade
agreement with the PRC on a governmental level. On September 21,
1952, a tripartite trade agreement was signed under which 34 million
rubles in trade between the Soviet Union, Finland and China was
planned for the remainder of 1952.135 This was followed by the
general trade agreement of June 5, 1953."' Since then, annual agreements have been concluded which, except for upward changes in the
annual quotas, are almost identically worded. To each of these agreements is appended a list of commodities which each country may export
to the other. Prices are based on those prevailing in the world market.
A separate payments agreement was also concluded on June 5, 1953,137
which, with subsequent amendments, governs the method of payments
with respect to contracts concluded pursuant to these trade agreements.
In addition to the trade and payments agreements, an exchange of
notes on March 31, 1956 makes applicable the most-favored-nation
doctrine 1 - in matters concerning customs exemptions and navigation.'
Interviews in Helsinki with Finnish officials involved in the
negotiation of many of these agreements indicate that negotiation with
the PRC is always difficult, involving hard bargaining and frequent
delays resulting from Chinese referrals to Peking for instructions on
many matters which would normally lie within the discretionary power
of a Western negotiator. However, once a result is reached, the
Chinese can be counted upon to abide by their agreement.
Cuban News, supra note 129, at 8-10.
135 2 PRC TRanTY Smuxs 174.
134

136 Id. at 35.
137 Id. at 37.

138 A most-favored-nation clause is generally included in major PRC trade agreements. Its purpose is to protect Chinese exports against discrimination in the world
market and to defeat any embargo against the PRC. See WANG YAO-T'IEN, Kuo-cHI
Mou-i T'iAo-YfiH HO HSIEH-TING (International Trade Treaties and Agreements)
116 (1958).
139 5 PRC TREATY SRm s 61.
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Sweden's commercial treaty relations with the PRC are less
extensive than those of Finland. Two agreements were concluded in
1957: a trade agreement on November 8th 140 and an exchange of
notes on copyrights dated April 6th and 8th." To these may be added
an exchange of notes constituting an agreement on the establishment
of consular relations, dated June 24, 1954,"= giving Sweden the right
to establish a consulate in Shanghai, and the PRC the right to establish
a consulate in Sweden "at a place to be agreed upon." Because of the
lack of actual need, no consulate exists at present in either country.
Officials in Stockholm had shared Helsinki's views concerning
Chinese compliance with treaty obligations. However, whether they
will continue to hold this view is problematical in the light of a recent
trade fair incident about which details are still lacking. After three
years of negotiation with Peking authorities, a large Swedish industrial
exhibition had been scheduled to take place in Peking April 3-13, 1967.
A total of 136 Swedish firms, including SKF, makers of ball bearings,
Volvo, Saab and Scnia-Vabis, were involved and had invested some
$1,200,000 in the project. About 200 Swedish businessmen planned
to travel to Peking for the opening of the exhibition, which was intended
to boost substantially Swedish exports to China (amounting to
$14,000,000 in the previous year). The Swedes were encouraged by
the fact that Atlas Copco, manufacturers of drills, had signed a contract
with Peking in June, 1966, on behalf of a Swedish syndicate for the
delivery of $7,000,000 of mining equipment. A freighter carrying
450 tons of Swedish machines sailed with great ceremony from
Gothenburg on December 5, 1966.
In late December, Swedish Ambassador to Peking, Lennart Petri,
received notice that the exhibition would be canceled because the
premises had been taken over by the Red Guards for storage purposes. 4
A month later, however, the Federation of Swedish Industries announced that it would go ahead with the exhibition as planned.'
On
February 6, 1967, a Swedish Foreign Office spokesman confirmed a
newspaper report of the same date that the scheduled exhibition would
45
not be held.
Although Chinese authorities had offered the Swedes another site
in place of that taken over by the Red Guards, Swedish businessmen
wished to send a delegate to Peking to inspect the new site before the
140 6 PRC
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141 Id. at 180.
142228 U.N.T.S. 154, at 154-56.
143 Japan Times, Dec. 28, 1966, at 9, col.
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'44Japan Times, Jan. 26, 1967, at 12, col. 7.

145 Mainichi Daily News, Feb. 8, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
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exhibition was held. His application for a visa was reportedly not
acted upon in time for the exhibition. Meanwhile, the freighter carrying the Swedish machines had arrived in Shanghai. Rather than take
a chance on unloading and sending the machines to Peking only to
find the fair site undesirable, the Swedes reluctantly decided to cancel
the whole venture. They received refunds for the rents for the exhibition hall and decided to sell the exhibition goods in Shanghai and
other ports and to bring back to Sweden only what could not be
sold.' 46 Details are lacking as to the existence of any financial liability
on the part of the Chinese authorities for losses incurred as a result
of this incident.
It is interesting to note that, despite the Swedish misadventure,
Danish industrialists went ahead with plans for an exhibition in Peking
March 1-15, 1967. According to Mr. John Ljunggreen, an organizer
for the Danish Committee for Foreign Exhibitions, the Chinese posed
no problems for the Danes, and about seventy Danes were reported
to have visited Peking. 4 7 Apparently, the Danish exhibition was
planned to be much smaller than the Swedish one and required only
about a quarter of the space needed by the Swedes, which explains
perhaps why it did not have to compete for room with the Red Guards.
A noteworthy event in Sino-Norwegian trade relations pertained
to the settlement of a contract dispute by the Chinese Maritime Arbitration Commission. The Norwegian vessel M/S "Varild" went
aground in Tungsha near Shanghai on April 4, 1961. It was salvaged
by the Shanghai Salvage Bureau under a contract containing the
standard form of the Maritime Arbitration Commission of the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade. A dispute arose
over the amount of remuneration for the salvager who filed an application for arbitration with the Commission. Pursuant to Article 19 of
the Rules of Procedure, the Arbitration Tribunal, with the consent of
the disputants, proceeded with conciliation. In the end, concessions
4
were made by both sides and the dispute was amicably resolved.
Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm), Feb. 6, 1967, at 3.
Daily News, Feb. 8, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
48
1
The M/S "Varild" Case. Maritime Arbitration Commission, China Council
for the Promotion of International Trade, Peking. Conciliatory Conclusion: (63)
Tiao Tzai No. 011. See also Decision of the State Council of the PRC concerning the
Establishment of a Maritime Arbitration Commission within the China Council for
the Promotion of International Trade, adopted on November 12, 1958, at the 82d
Sesssion of the State Council; Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Maritime
Arbitration Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade, adopted on January 8, 1959, at the 7th Session of the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade.
For the establishment of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and its
activities, see Hsiao Fang-chou, Ten Years of the China Council for the Promotion
of Internatioial Trade, FOREIGN TRADE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIc OF CHINA, No. 2
(Ser. No. 18) at 2, 3 (June 1962).
146
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F. Economic Assistance
The entry of the PRC into the field of foreign aid barely five years
after its establishment reversed the century-old pattern in which China
had always been on the receiving end of foreign largesse. Although a
loan to Albania was granted under an agreement of December 3,
1954,'14 full-scale assistance programs did not begin until 1956, when
the PRC concluded aid agreements with Cambodia, 5 ' Mongolia,5 1
Nepal 5' 2 and Indonesia."5 Since then, loans or other types of assistance have been rendered to Ceylon, Yemen, Guinea, Burma, Ghana,
Mali, Cuba, North Korea, North Viet Nam, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Syria, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, the Congo (Brazzaville)
and Tanzania.
While occasional variations exist in the loan or aid agreements,
the following distinctive features may be noted:
(1) Many Chinese agreements begin with the explicit statement
that there are no strings attached to the aid and that there will be no
interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries.5'
(2) Loans are usually interest-free, repayable by installments
over a ten-year period after a specified number of years.'5 5 Some
agreements additionally specify that repayments may be made in the
form of mutually acceptable commodities of the debtor country or
third countries.' 6
(3) Travel expenses and salaries of experts and technical personnel are usually to be paid by China, while their local living expenses
are to be deductible from the aid funds. However, the standard of
14) 3 PRC TRATY SERiEs 55.
150 5 PRC TRAaTY SmEss 109.
5

1 1 Id. at 144.
5
' = Id. at 32.
M Id. at 57.
154 E.g., Agreement on Economic Assistance Between China and Nepal, Oct. 7,
1956, 5 PRC TREATY SERIEs 32; Highway Construction Agreement Between China
and Nepal, Oct. 15, 1961, 10 PRC TREATY SERiEs 423; Agreement on Economic
and Technical Cooperation Between China and Ghana, Aug. 18, 1961, id. at 250;
Agreement on Economic Assistance Between China and Cambodia, June 21, 1956,
5 PRC TREATY SER Es 109, and its implementation agreement of the same date,
id. at 111.
155 E.g., Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation Between China and
Syria, Feb. 21, 1963, 12 PRC TREATY SERlXs 171; Agreement on Economic and
Technical Cooperation Between China and Mali, Sept. 22, 1961, 10 PRC TREATY
SERIES 333; Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation Between China and
Guinea, Sept. 13, 1960, 9 PRC TREATY SERIES 80.
'156E.g., Agreement Between China and Mali, supra note 155; Agreement Between China and Ghana, supra note 154.
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living of these personnel must not be higher than that of local personnel
at the same level or grade. 5'
(4) Separate agreements are to be concluded concerning the
details of assistance, such as the type of commodities, equipment and
machines to be shipped from China; specifications on factories or
bridges to be built; the number of technical experts to be sent; the
detailed routes of a highway to be constructed. These agreements,
however, are not published."'
In addition to the above loan and aid agreements, mention may
be made of the Chinese establishment of joint shipping lines with
Albania and Tanzania as another form of assistance. Under a SinoTanzanian agreement announced in Dar-es-Salaam on July 7, 1966,
for example, a joint shipping line was established to operate between
China and Tanzania. The line would begin with two 10,000-ton
vessels and with an initial capital of E1,500,000, all supplied by China.
One-half of the capital, however, would represent Tanzania's share,
which China would make available as an interest-free loan repayable
from the shipping line's profit over a ten-year period beginning in
1977.'5' If the Albanian model is followed, there will be an annual
meeting of the board of directors, whose decisions will constitute a
semi-official agreement between the two countries. 00
Since the economic aid agreements could present an opportunity
for judging China's actions when she is dealing from a position of
strength, a review of these agreements would be particularly significant
for the present study. In view of the nonpublication of detailed aidimplementation agreements and an understandable reluctance on the
part of aid recipients to look a gift horse in the mouth, however, a
systematic evaluation of Chinese compliance with respect to the aid
agreements could not be undertaken at this time.
157See

Agreement Between China and Nepal, supra note 154; Agreement Be-

tween China and Ghana, supra note 154; Agreement Between China and Guinea,
.mpranote 155.
158 Recent discontinuance of the Chinese aid program in Burma in the aftermath
of Burmese rioting in which more than 50 Chinese were reportedly killed (including
a textile expert on Chinese Embassy premises) brought to light certain information
concerning the nature of the program. Chinese aid equivalent to $84,000,000 had
been provided to Burma in the form of an interest-free loan for materials and technical services. Under this assistance, a river bridge and a sugar refinery have been
completed, while work has begun on a paper mill, another bridge, a plywood mill and
a textile mill. Plans were also made for an hydroelectric plant, a bicycle tire plant
and the expansion of a small steel mill. Some 390 Chinese aid technicians were
reportedly involved in the various projects. That Burma retained control over the
content and direction of the programs may be seen by the fact that General Ne Win
had vetoed Chinese aid projects aimed at improving communications between Burma's
northern regions and China. See N.Y. Times, July 8. 1967, at 3, col. 1; July 9,
1967, § 4, at 3, col. 1; July 12, 1967, at 10, col. 5; Nov. 1, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
159 1966 KasIdN's CoxTE . ARcnimEs, July 2-9, at 21488A.
160 See reference to the fourth such agreement between China and Albania in
JaN-mix

Snou-Ts'F (People's Handbook) 266 (1965).
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G. Cultural Agreements
For the promotion of mutual understanding and goodwill, the
PRC has entered into an extensive network of cultural agreements with
friendly states providing for the exchange of students, scholars, technical experts and newsmen as well as publications and information.
Indeed, such exchanges exist even in the absence of a cultural agreement
and even between states not recognizing each other.
Among the agreements first concluded by the PRC and now a
subject of bitter controversy were those with the Soviet Union: Agreement on Admission of Chinese Citizens into Higher Soviet Institutions
of August 9, 1952; '"' Agreement on Broadcasting Cooperation of
August 21, 1954; 102 Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement
of October 12, 1954; ' Agreement on Cultural Cooperation of July 5,
1956.1'
In addition, there are, where applicable, annual or semiannual implementation agreements, the latest of which is the Protocol
of the 15th session of the Sino-Soviet Committee for Scientific and
Technical Cooperation, signed on November 6, 1966 in Peking." 5
In view of the current controversy in which Peking and Moscow
have accused each other of violating their cultural cooperation agreements, the major provisions of the 1956 agreement may be briefly described: the agreement calls for an exchange of students, researchers
and teachers; the promotion and development of direct contacts between
higher institutions; and exchange of educational experiences, materials
and publications. (Article 2.) Detailed annual plans for implementation, including annual budgets, are to be drawn up by October of each
preceding year through diplomatic channels. (Articles 3 and 4.) The
agreement was to be of five-years' duration, and to be automatically
renewed if no notice for its termination was received six months prior
to the termination date. (Article 5.) It may be noted that this kind
of long-term agreement supplemented by annual implementation agreements is a common pattern in cultural agreements concluded by
the PRC.
Like many other controversies between the Soviet Union and the
PRC, the cultural dispute has its origin in the ideological cleavage of
the late nineteen fifties, but was exacerbated by the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution. The Revolution caused a one-year shut-down of
1612 PRC TREATY SEIEs 179.
1023 PRC TRATY Smzs 157.
363 Id. at 170.
104 5 PRC TREAnr SERIES 152.
165 Hsinhua News Agency Release, No. 6506, Nov. 7, 1966, at 2 (Eng. ed.);
U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press No. 3817,
Nov. 8, 1966, at 41.
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all institutes of higher learning in China to enable students to participate in Red Guard activities and to revamp the "bourgeois-infested"
educational system throughout China. This inevitably affected all
foreign students in China, who suddenly found themselves without
schools to attend. Since there was no role for them to play in the
cultural revolution, arrangements were made for them to suspend their
studies for a year, while those nearing completion of their studies
were to be graduated ahead of schedule.-"" The Soviet Union, however,
considered the Chinese action to be a breach of the cultural agreement
and decided not only to recall its students from China, but also to expel
Chinese students from the Soviet Union. The Soviet expulsion of
some sixty-five Chinese students was in turn protested by China as a
"grave incident," in which the Soviet Government has "flagrantly
violated the agreement on cultural cooperation between China and the
Soviet Union." 117 In elaborating on this at a Peking rally to welcome
home the expelled Chinese students, China's Vice Minister of Higher
Education Tuan Lo-fu stated:
The great proletarian cultural revolution has been developing vigorously in China and, in the course of it, all
institutes of higher learning have discontinued their course.
It has not been possible to arrange separate courses for
foreign students in China. Therefore we decided that all the
students from other countries would have to stop their studies
for a year, while those about to graduate could do so ahead
of schedule. In each case the time of graduation for the
Soviet students, was to be settled after consultation with the
Soviet side. We set no time limit as to when the Soviet
students should leave China for home. The Soviet Union
is not carrying on a great cultural revolution. Its schools
have not stopped their courses and students from various
countries in the Soviet Union are carrying on their studies
as usual. Yet without consulting with the Chinese side, the
Soviet Government unilaterally decided to drive out all the
Chinese students studying in the Soviet Union. What else
is this other than a deliberate action to undermine the relations
between China and the Soviet Union and stir up further antiChinese sentiment? "6
Some East European countries, such as Hungary, 6 ' have followed
the Soviet position that the Chinese action constituted a violation of
their cultural agreements, hence justifying retaliation. The question
106

N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
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168 Hsinhua News Agency Release No. 6506, Nov. 6, 1966, at la; U.S. Consulate
General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press No. 3818, Nov. 9, 1966, at 31.
169 Japan Times, Nov. 27, 1966, at 2, col. 1.
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may be raised as to whether the Chinese action indeed constituted a
treaty violation or was merely a case of temporary impossibility of
performance justifying a suspension of the operation of the treaty. The
latter view appears to be supported by the International Law Commission's Law of Treaties as adopted in 1966:
Article 58. Supervening impossibility of performance
A party may invoke an impossibility of performing a
treaty as a ground for terminating it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an
object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the
impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a
70
ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.1
171
It may be noted that, in his Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties,
Sir Humphrey Waldock, the Special Rapporteur, proposed the inclusion of an additional paragraph which would have denied a state
the right to invoke the above provision "if the impossibility of performance is the result of a breach of the treaty by the party invoking such
impossibility." The Commission, after a lengthy debate in which the
Soviet member joined with several others in opposing Sir Humphrey's
proposal, decided to drop the qualifying paragraph.Y2 Their opposition was based on grounds of impracticality and the view that the
qualifying provision would lie more properly within the purview of
State responsibility. It is significant to note, however, that the Commission decided to retain a similar qualifying paragraph in Article 59
Discussing the need for
(Fundamental Change of Circumstances).
equitable adjustment in the case of a temporary suspension of a treaty
which has been partially executed, the Commission called for application
of the principle of good faith. 4
Applying the above principles to the case at hand, it would appear
that the closing of all universities in China for one year-a move
directed fundamentally at Chinese students and only incidentally affecting the Soviet and other foreign students-would constitute grounds
for temporary impossibility of performing a student-exchange treaty
because of the disappearance of "an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty." Whether the temporary closing of the universities
was wise or desirable under the Cultural Revolution is immaterial;

17o Emphasis added. See International Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties and Commentaries, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966).
171 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183/Add. 3, at 6 (1966).
172 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'IN 67-75, 129-30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1966).
173 See Art. 59(2) (b) of Draft Articles, supra note 170, at 82.
174 See Art. 66 Commentary (4) of Draft Articles, supra note 170, at 93.
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that the closing was a proper exercise of national sovereign power cannot be questioned. By signing a student-exchange agreement, the
PRC did not sign away its power to close all its universities during
national emergencies. The Soviet Union might legitimately call upon
the PRC to assume a greater share of financial responsibility consequent
upon the withdrawal of Soviet students. However, the Russian decision to expel the Chinese students appears to fall short of the "good
faith" requirement." 5
H. UNICEF

The substantive part of the present study concludes with a discussion of the relationship between the United Nations International
Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 1' and the PRC and its
precursors. UNICEF maintained a working relationship with Chinese
Communist authorities for more than a year, based upon an exchange
of letters of mutual understanding in Shihchiachuang in August,
78
1948, 7 and continuing until after the establishment of the PRC.
Experience gained from this period might be useful in future dealings
between the United Nations and the PRC.
UNICEF was established for the benefit of children and adolescents of countries which were victims of aggression or which had been
79
receiving help from UNRRA, and for child health purposes generally.
Its guiding principle was one of nondiscrimination," s and assistance
could be rendered to states not members of the United Nations. Before
aid will be granted, however, prior agreements must be entered into
by UNICEF and the recipient state concerning matters of supply, distribution, contribution, control and supervision.
175 It may be noted that, although the Chinese decision also affected students in
China from other countries, Chinese students in those countries have not been expelled, but ostensibly have returned to China to participate in the Cultural Revolution.
For a discussion of Asian and African students affected by the Chinese decision,
see Rdalit~s Cambodgiennes (Phnom-Penh), Sept. 30, 1966, at 2, col. 1. For the
story of the latest return of 70 students from Algeria, see Japan Times, Feb. 8, 1967,
at 4, col. 8.
176UNICEF was established pursuant to G.A. Res. 57 (I), 1 U.N. GAOR 1157,
U.N. Doc. A/230 (1946). By G.A. Res. 802 (VIII), 8 U.N. GAOR 237 (1953),
U.N. Doc. A/L. 163, the name of the organization was changed to the United Nations
Children's Fund, retaining the symbol UNICEF. See 1953 YEAPOK OF THE UNrr
NATIONs 467-68.
1 T See text accompanying notes 182-84 infra.
1 8
7 The Shihchiachuang Understanding was terminated on December 30, 1949.
Although UNICEF personnel in Peking were given until the end of January, 1950,
to "wind up all their affairs," see New China News Agency, Daily News Release
No. 244, Jan. 1, 1950, relations with Peking authorities continued intermittently until
the departure of the last UNICEF officer from Peking in January, 1951. See note
187 infra.
179 See 1946-47 YEAIooK oF THE UNITED NATIONS 163.
180 See G.A. Res. 57(I), 1ff2(b) (ii), 1 U.N. GAOR 1157, U.N. Doc. A/230
(1946), in 1946-47 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIoNs 163.
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In February 1948, Dr. Marcel Junod was sent to China by
UNICEF to reach an agreement with the Nationalist Government. A
standard UNICEF Basic Agreement was signed in Nanking on May
21, 1948, establishing a program for feeding and clothing needy children in several large cities.
Since the above agreement could not apply to Communist-held
territories, the Executive Board of UNICEF adopted a resolution on
April 28, 1948, which set aside an initial allocation of $500,000 for
the establishment of a program "in areas not under the direct control
of the Government." ' Dr. Leo Eloesser, head of UNICEF's North
China Field Team (NCFT) was to negotiate with the Communist authorities for a letter of understanding incorporating basic UNICEF
principles. After a series of discussions in Shihchiachuang, the Headquarters of the China Liberated Areas Relief Association (CLARA),18
in mid-August, 1948, a Letter of Understanding bearing the seal of
8
chairman of CLARA, and signed by General Wu
Tung Pi-wu,"'
Fu-sun, Secretary-General of CLARA, was obtained by UNICEF's
team on August 30th. The letter accepted UNICEF's proposal dated
August 27th,"s which had contained the following key provisions:
1). The UNICEF program shall be undertaken for the
benefit of needy children and expectant and nursing mothers
without discrimination because of race, creed or political
belief, and the supplies and personnel furnished by UNICEF
shall not be used for any other purpose.
2). Supplies imported by UNICEF shall be matched by
CLARA by making available such personnel, warehousing,
services, internal transportation and miscellaneous equipment
as are necessary to the carrying out of the program. In
anticipation of supplies to be received from UNICEF a plan
of operations shall be drawn up and mutually agreed upon,
indicating the method by which these supplies are to be used
and designating the categories and approximate numbers of
children and mothers who may be served under the program.
3). All supplies imported by UNICEF into the area
shall remain the property of UNICEF and shall be utilized
1.817 U.N. ECOSOC 6, U.N. Doc. E/ICEF/59 (1948).
182 CLARA had participated in tri-partite relief projects with UNRRA and
CNRRA (Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Agency-the Nationalist counterpart of CLARA). Its personnel were withdrawn from Tientsin and Shanghai
following the failure of peace negotiations between the Nationalists and Communists.
it was superseded in the spring of 1950 by the People's Relief Administration of
China, headed by Mine. Sun Yat-sen, with General Wu Yun-fu as Secretary-General.
83
Mr. Tung was the lone Communist member of the Chinese delegation to the
'
San Francisco Conference establishing the United Nations in 1945. See Doc. 639,
G/3(2), 1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 18 (1945). At present he is one of the two Vice Presidents of the PRC (the other being Mine. Sun Yat-sen).
154The proposal was modeled upon an earlier UNICEF Basic Agreement with
the Nationalist Government, May 21, 1948.
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under the supervision and control of UNICEF personnel
until consumed or received by the end-user. In distributing
or otherwise handling such supplies according to the mutually
agreed upon Plan of Operations, CLARA shall be entrusted
to act until the supplies are consumed or used. Distribution
shall be free of charge to the end-users.
4). Expenses in local currency for housing, feeding and
incidental expenses required by UNICEF personnel in the
area will be met by CLARA; facilities for travel and transportation shall also be furnished.
5). Radio liaison with Hong Kong shall be maintained
and UNICEF representatives shall be furnished facilities by
the CLARA authorities to send plain messages necessary to
the UNICEF program.
6). UNICEF personnel shall have all necessary freedom to supervise distribution of UNICEF supplies. The
UNICEF program shall enjoy full freedom of publicity.
A program involving public health training and medical supplies was
adopted on the basis of the above understanding. The medical supplies
aspect soon became the subject of controversy, however, and increasingly strained relations between CLARA and UNICEF developed as
the oft-delayed medical supplies began to arrive in North China in
March, 1949.'
Disputes centered on the meaning of the ambiguous
language of Paragraph 3 of the understanding which referred to "supervision and control" of the supplies. UNICEF emphasized that the
supervision and control envisaged by the first part of Paragraph 3 was
to extend both to utilization of supplies and to their distribution and
handling. CLARA, stressing the latter part of the same paragraph,
insisted, however, that the provision of Paragraph 3 that CLARA
"shall be entrusted to act" with respect to distribution and handling
was intended to bestow on CLARA absolute control over those
processes, subject only to UNICEF supervision. The focal point of
dispute became the location of warehousing facilities, with UNICEF
insisting on Peking, because it was more easily accessible to NCFT
personnel, and CLARA insisting on Tientsin, near the port of entry.
Since neither side was willing to give in, UNICEF decided, in May,
1949, to suspend further shipments from Hong Kong to North China
until the warehousing issue could be resolved-a decision regarded by
CLARA as an attempt to coerce it into bowing to UNICEF's will.
For the remainder of the year, only one shipment was made to North
China and that shipment of supplies for the BCG laboratory was made
185 The first shipment had originally been expected to arrive in late 1948. Delays
were due to difficulties in procurement and shipping under civil war conditionm,
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directly to the National Vaccine and Serum Institute in Peking, thus
bypassing CLARA.
On September 22, 1949, General Wu Yun-fu, Secretary-General
of CLARA, addressed a letter to UNICEF's representative in North
China calling for a prompt resumption of shipments from Hong Kong
to Tientsin, quick distribution of supplies already in North China and
devotion of the balance of allocations for the purchase of supplies to
combat the infectious disease kalaazar. Otherwise, CLARA would
be "forced to reconsider the question of the continued validity of the
Shihchiachuang Agreement." UNICEF's representative replied by
reiterating the earlier positions regarding supervision and control of
warehousing, and stating its readiness to withdraw from North China,
unless CLARA observed the Shihchiachuang Understanding.
On December 30, 1949, three months after the establishment of
the PRC, the Acting Secretary-General of CLARA, Hsiung Chin-ting,
issued a statement "' declaring the abrogation of the Shihchiachuang
8

The text of the statement appeared in New China News Agency, Daily News
Release, No. 244, Jan. 1, 1950. It reads as follows:
The Shihchiachuang understanding was reached in conformity with the
letter of Dr. Leo Eloesser, representative of the United Nations International
Children's Emergency Fund in North China, dated August 27, 1948, and the
reply by the China Liberated Areas Relief Association dated August 30,
1948. But after reaching this understanding, Dr. Leo Eloesser did not act
according to its spirit. The main facts during the past year and more are
as follows:
1. It was agreed upon by both parties that the first shipment of
supplies should arrive by the end of December, 1948, but, in fact, this
shipment did not arrive until March, 1949.
2. The first shipment of supplies received amounted to only
US$105,000 which was approximately one seventh of the stipulated
amount of US$750,000 (original amount of US$500,000 plus a later
increase of US$250,000). During the nine months from March to
December, 1949, no supplies whatsoever were received.
3. There were altogether 824 cases in the first shipment of supplies of which 304 cases were scott paper and cellulose tissue. These
were not what we needed.
Under such conditions, we had several talks with Dr. Eloesser to seek
an improvement of the situation. But he showed no intention of making any
improvement.
Before Dr. Eloesser returned to the United States, we wrote to him on
September 22 of this year, urging him to observe the spirit of the Shihachiachuang understanding by promptly shipping the supplies remaining in Hongkong to Tientsin and by purchasing with the remaining funds medicines for
the treatment of kalaazar which we needed. We told him that the shipments
of US$750,000's worth of supplies should be completed by the end of December, 1949.
But Dr. Eloesser, in his reply letter dated September 24, 1949, utterly
ignored the reasonable opinion, but on the contrary, he demanded that we
accept what he called certain attached conditions. But he did not make clear
what the contents of these so-called attached conditions were. According to
the facts of the several talks we had with him, the attached conditions meant
a long disputed condition which we could not agree to, namely the right of
complete control over the distribution and storage of the incoming shipments
of supplies. He further said that the United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund stood ready to withdraw its set-up in North China should
we fail to accept the so-called attached conditions as stated in his letter.
1
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Understanding as a result of UNICEF's violations. In addition to
objecting to UNICEF's positions concerning distribution and storage,
it criticized UNICEF for the suspension of shipments, as well as the
poor quality and small quantity of supplies already shipped.
It is clear that under the terms of Paragraph 3 of the understanding, title to all supplies was to remain in UNICEF until consumed or used. Indeed, with respect to ownership of the supplies,
there was no disagreement between UNICEF and CLARA. Nor
were there any reports of tampering with UNICEF labels on supplies
shipped to North China or other interference with UNICEF's publicity activities as provided for by Paragraph 6 of the understanding.
It was also quite clear that, under Paragraph 3, utilization would
be subject to UNICEF supervision and control. The fact that CLARA
repeatedly urged UNICEF to agree to a rapid distribution of supplies
already on hand is an indication that UNICEF's control over the
utilization of the supplies was recognized by CLARA. It may be
noted that UNICEF participated with CLARA and Ministry of
Health representatives as late as December, 1949, in drawing up allocation plans for such supplies. They approved all allocations before
releasing the supplies to a wide variety of nurseries, clinics, hospitals
and the Tungchow training center. This participation took place even
during the period when relations with CLARA were severely strained
as a result of UNICEF's suspension of further medical shipments due
to disagreement over warehousing.
At this point, Dr. Eloesser's real intention in consistently violating the
Shihchiachuang understanding was laid bare. After his return to the United
States, Dr. Eloesser made a statement saying that US$750,000 had been spent
in liberated China (according to the Lake Success despatch of November 5
in the Shanghai North ChinaDaily News). This is entirely inconsistent with
facts.
Dr. Eloesser, representing the United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund, insisted on his unreasonable conditions and violated the
Shihchiachuang understanding, thus depriving it of any practical significance.
Because of this, I have to make the following solemn statement:
From now on we are no longer bound by the Shihchiachuang
understanding. At the same time, we must point out: facts have
proved that the supplies left and stored in Hongkong by Dr. Eloesser
were not intended to be shipped to the liberated areas of China, but
were to be used for bribing the Chinese people into bowing to American imperialism. We refuse to be bought and we do not bow to
American imperialism, so he will "redistribute elsewhere" that shipment of supplies.
In order to facilitate the winding up of the branch office in North China
of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, we permit
its twelve staff members in Peking to wind up all their affairs by the end of
January, 1950.
HSIUJNG CHIN TING
Acting Secretary General of the China
Liberated Areas Relief Association,
Peking,
December 30, 1949
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With respect to the distribution and handling of supplies, however, the understanding is far from clear. As far as can be ascertained,
UNICEF's right to supervise the distribution and handling of supplies
was never challenged by CLARA. Indeed, CLARA suggested that
UNICEF send a representative to the proposed central warehouse in
Tientsin. However, all attempts by UNICEF to control distribution
and handling (including warehousing) were opposed by CLARA on
the ground that Paragraph 3 entrusted to CLARA alone the right to
distribute or otherwise handle the supplies until consumed or used, and
that Paragraph 6 conferred upon UNICEF personnel the right to
"all necessary freedom to supervise distribution of UNICEF supplies."
On the whole, the text could support CLARA's distinction between
control over utilization of the supplies and their distribution and
handling, a distinction UNICEF sought to blur by its insistence on
control over both. Moreover, CLARA was obliged by Paragraph 2
to make available not only warehousing, but also "such personnel,
. . services, internal transportation and miscellaneous equipment as
are necessary to the carrying out of the program." Thus, any argument for giving UNICEF control over warehousing under the circumstances also would grant to UNICEF control over the personnel,
services, internal transportation and equipment made available by
CLARA. If concessions of such a serious nature, affecting sovereign
prerogatives, were intended, it surely ought to have been more clearly
stated in the text of the understanding. It may be significant to note
that no attempt to control the personnel or internal transportation
provided by CLARA was ever made by UNICEF.
In any event, apart from any question of the proper construction
of the language of the agreement, UNICEF's decision to suspend
medical shipments to China because of the disagreement over warehousing must be considered rather drastic in the absence of any prior
abuse or misappropriation of UNICEF supplies by CLARA, any
doubts about CLARA personnel's honesty and integrity, and the
ambiguous grounds for UNICEF's control over warehousing under
the Shihchiachuang Understanding. Subsequent interruption of the
flow of supplies over a period of more than half a year, despite repeated
protests, well might constitute a legitimate ground for termination of
the Understanding by China. The irony of the situation is that after
the termination of the Understanding, the flow of supplies was resumed-and on an "unconditional" basis without any control or
supervision by UNICEF in China.
In an attempt to continue relations with the PRC, UNICEF announced in January, 1950, its willingness to resume shipments and to
send a representative to Peking to negotiate a Basic Agreement and
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draw up a program for utilizing the allocation to China of some seven
million dollars. CLARA replied that it would accept UNICEF supplies now only on an "unconditional" basis-without any commitment
as to the use of supplies. Further discussion could take place only
after their arrival. Some $300,000 worth of supplies were shipped
shortly afterwards and turned over to CLARA by UNICEF in
s7
Tientsin.
Space permits only a brief discussion of CLARA's conduct in relation to the remaining provisions in the Shihchiachuang Understanding.
In contrast to the medical supply program, the training program
proceeded smoothly, with Dr. Eloesser inaugurating the first UNICEFsponsored People's Health Workers Training Course for twenty
students in a village near Shihchiachuang on November 20, 1948. Its
object was "to train in the essential rudiments of sanitation, health and
midwifery a large number of people." "s Promising graduates of each
class were to be selected to serve as instructors in additional training
centers to be established. By the time the course had ended on
February 12, 1949, additional major cities in North China had been
taken over by the Communists. Consequently, the training center was
relocated in Tungchow, near Peking, and the second course, with an
enlarged enrollment of 80 and a longer training period, began on
July 16, 1949. This course, blessed with newly arrived UNICEF
87

UNICEF's subsequent relations with Peking, though interesting, must be left
out of the present study inasmuch as they were no longer based upon the Shihchiachuang Understanding. Subsequent responses from CLARA and other Chinese authorities to UNICEF inquiries and offers of assistance were usually oral and were
negative. An exception occurred in early summer, 1950, when Peking officials drew
up lists of requirements with UNICEF medical advisers in response to UNICEF's
offer to secure anti-kalaazar medicines and supplies, using the unprocured balance
of the original Shihchiachuang allocation. However, they declined UNICEF's offer
of technical assistance and request for an observer to visit the field of operations.
Shipment arrived during the winter of 1950-51.
On August 25, 1950, Premier Chou En-lai cabled the Chairman of the UNICEF
Executive Board, nominating General Wu Yun-fu as the PRC's representative on
that Board. At its meeting in later November, 1950, the vote on the motion to seat
the Peking nominee resulted in a tie. A second vote was taken, and the result was
again a tie. The motion therefore failed of adoption. UNICEF then decided to
suspend "temporarily" its China Mission and recall its staff. The last staff member
in Peking departed in January, 1951.
Similarly omitted from the study are UNICEF's relations with Chinese Communist authorities in the newly occupied cities of Nanking and Shanghai, where
UNICEF had conducted large-scale feeding and clothing programs under the 1948
Basic Agreement with the Nationalist Government. The Communist authorities
refused to recognize the UNICEF-Nationalist Chinese agreement, and considered
the Shihchiachuang Understanding inapplicable to Nanking and Shanghai both
geographically and because the programs in those cities had covered feeding and
clothing. Consistent with this stand, Chinese authorities in Nanking and Shanghai
considered UNICEF personnel as ordinary civilians without any immunity. One
of them subsequently experienced great difficulty in obtaining an exit permit and
was not permitted to depart until April, 1951.
188For this purpose Dr. Eloesser wrote a 164-page text with index and appendices entitled, FIRST AID: EMERGENCY TREATMENT OF INrUES; PREPARATION OF
DRESSINGS AND SURGICAL SUPPLIES: A SHORT MANUAL FOR PEOPLE'S HEALTu WoRxEas

(Pen Tu Chuang, 1949).
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drugs and medical equipment and additional training personnel, proved,
however, to be the last held under UNICEF's auspices. Following the
abrogation of the Shihchiachuang Understanding in late 1949,
UNICEF technical personnel remained at CLARA's request until the
end of the course in late January, 1950. Building on the foundations
already laid, a third course was held without UNICEF personnel, but
with UNICEF medical supplies and equipment. The training project
had proved its worth and had contributed in no small measure to the
vast expansion of public health services throughout China in subsequent
years. It may be stressed that in carrying out the training program,
both in Shihchiachuang and in Tungchow, an excellent working relationship was maintained between UNICEF and the Chinese Communist
health authorities. Both the letter and spirit of the Shihchiachuang
Understanding appear to have been lived up to by all parties concerned.
Thus, UNICEF was able, within a short span of time and with
meager resources, to build a foundation for public health training to the
great benefit of the Chinese people.
It also will be recalled, that Paragraph 5 obligated CLARA to
provide UNICEF with special radio equipment and facilities in
Shihchiachuang for communication with Hong Kong. This was
complied with, and the equipment was not removed for other purposes
even after the departure of UNICEF personnel for Peking, until
UNICEF indicated, in response to a specific inquiry, that it no longer
needed the equipment.
Of considerable interest is CLARA's policy in regard to Paragraph 4 of the Understanding, which provided that "Expenses in local
currency for housing, feeding and incidental expenses required by
UNICEF personnel in the area will be met by CLARA." UNICEF
had proposed a per diem allowance equal in local currency to $1.60 for
each Western employee living alone and a higher flat rate of $130 for
each employee living with dependents. CLARA rejected the flat rate
on the ground that subsistence and billeting for dependents were not
provided for in the Understanding. It did accept, on the other hand,
the per diem rate of $1.60 for both foreign and Chinese personnel of
UNICEF, thus placing them on a footing of complete equality, and
making no distinction between salary for local personnel and subsistence for foreign personnel. It may be noted that this rate was
from five to eight times higher than the average salary of a CLARA
employee. CLARA, thus, tolerated a discrepancy in pay between its
personnel and UNICEF's Chinese personnel, but insisted upon parity
of treatment for all UNICEF personnel, whether foreign or Chinese."s
189 This is consistent with the Chinese pay policy discussed in the text accompanying note 157 supra.
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V. CONCLUSIONS

Despite the tentativeness and incompleteness of the present study,
several broad conclusions may be drawn. In place of the picture of
mainland China bent upon a conquest of its neighbors, bullying the
weak and the small, it appears that with the exception of her boundaries
with India and Russia, all other boundaries of China have been delineated, in a manner which is often favorable to China's neighbors.
The PRC has, on the whole, complied with the Korean Armistice
Agreement and unilaterally withdrew its troops from Korea in 1958
when a simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea
proved impossible. There has been no published evidence of the
presence of Chinese troops outside China's soil.
Although under international law a nation need not enter into a
fisheries agreement with a state which does not recognize it, the PRC
has concluded such agreements with Japan, to Japan's advantage.
With respect to trade agreements, except for recent difficulties in connection with the Cultural Revolution, the PRC has enjoyed an excellent
reputation for meeting its obligations. The consensus appears to be
that, while negotiation with Peking is not always an easy matter, once
an unambiguous agreement is reached, compliance likely will follow.
Since China is not unduly concerned with the form an agreement takes,
so long as it expresses the will of the parties, Peking has concluded
many agreements on the nongovernmental level and complied with them
as treaties.
Reference was made earlier to the Chinese relinquishment of a
mining concession in Burma on the ground that it was incompatible
with the principles of the sovereign equality of states.19 0 The question may be raised whether this was but an isolated instance, or whether
from this there may be deduced a pattern of behavior against the
imposition of unequal treaties by China upon its weaker neighbors.
While generalization is difficult, the following case may shed some light
on the question.
Immediately following World War II, Nationalist Chinese troops
entered the northern half of Indo-China (north of the 16th parallel)
for the purpose of effecting the Japanese surrender and maintaining
order and security. After repeated attempts by France to resume
control of northern Indo-China, a Franco-Chinese exchange of letters
finally took place on February 28, 1946, providing for the withdrawal
of Chinese forces by March 31, 1946.191 Simultaneously, however, an
190 See note 43 supra.
1o1 Echange de lettres relatif a la r~lve des troupes Chinoises par les troupes
frangaises en Indochine du Nord, Feb. 28, 1946, in CHINESE MINISTY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, TREATIES BENWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES (19271961), at 150-52 (1963).
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agreement was signed governing Sino-Indo-Chinese relations. 9
special interest is Title II, which provided:

Of

Article 1. The French Government shall reserve in the port
of Haiphong a special zone, including the warehouses, berths
and, if possible, the wharves necessary for the free transit of
merchandise on the way from or to China. The Chinese
customs authorities shall be responsible for customs supervision in the zone and the French authorities shall be responsible for all other matters, in particular public safety
and health.
Article 2. Merchandise on the way from or to China's territory, and transported over the railways of Tonkin, shall pass
free of duty between the Sino-Indochinese frontier and the
zone reserved for Chinese international transit in the port
of Haiphong. Such merchandise shall be transported in
wagons which shall be sealed at the time of their departure
by the Chinese customs authorities.
Article 3. Merchandise on the way from or to China, and
transported by railway in Indochina, shall be exempt from all
transit dues or taxes.'93

While it is not unusual for states to accord customs exemptions to
2 4 the unreciprocated right to create a special zone
traffic in transit,"
in
Indochina with the necessary warehousing and docking facilities under
the exclusive customs jurisdiction of China may be regarded as a right
flowing from an unequal treaty. Would the People's Republic of China
insist upon this special right in its relations with the Democratic
People's Republic of Viet-Nam?
The PRC Treaties Series does not contain any treaty on this
subject, and inquiries to the French Embassy and the South Vietnamese
Embassy in Tokyo proved equally fruitless. However, through the
embassy of a third state which maintains a Consulate General in Hanoi,
the author was able to obtain the following information: on April 12,
1957, an agreement was signed between representatives of the Warehousing and Transport Bureau of the PRC Ministry of Commerce and
the Railway Administration of North Viet-Nam providing for the
customs-free transit of not more than 5,000 metric tons per month of
non-military goods through the territory of the Democratic People's
Republic of Viet-Nam between China's southwestern Yunnan province
and other parts of China. The prescribed routes were either by land
via Lao Cai in Viet-Nam to or from Pinghsiang in China's Kwangsi
192Accord Franco-Chinois sur les relations Sino-Indochinoises, Feb. 28, 1946,

in id. at 146-48.
'193 English

translation in 14 U.N.T.S. 137.

194 See, e.g., Art. 3 of the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land Locked
States, U.N. Doc. TD/TRANSIT/9, July 9, 1965.
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province, or by sea via Haiphong and a Chinese port. Significantly
omitted was any provision concerning a special zone in Haiphong with
the necessary warehousing and docking facilities under Chinese customs
jurisdiction.'9 5
What are the implications of the foregoing discussion for the
future? Rather than attempting any answer, the following questions
may instead be posed: In the absence of evidence concerning Chinese
noncompliance based on a review of observable and selected treaties and
informal agreements, and in view of at least one instance of Chinese
renunciation of special rights derived from unequal treaties, would it
not be in the world interest to place Peking under the regime of as
many treaties as possible, including the Charter of the United Nations,
the many multilateral conventions concluded under United Nations
auspices such as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and
the two Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
and the prospective disarmament treaties including one to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons?'" In the face of Peking's emphasis
on treaty-centered international law, would it not be desirable for
China to participate in the progressive development of international
law and its codification in the International Law Commission? Would
not international law be made more effective if it were accepted and
complied with by a state whose population constitutes a quarter of
humanity? Indeed, can "international law" be properly so-called if a
quarter of the world's population is outside its pale? Of more immediate relevance, what would be the impact, if any, of a treaty-bound
China upon future policies in Viet-Nam? ...
195 The text of the agreement is summarized in New China News Agency, April
12, 1957; U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, SURVEY OF CHINA MAINLAND PRESS,

No. 1512, April 17, 1957, at 58.

196 For a discussion of this subject between President Johnson and Premier Ion
Gheorghe Maurer of Roumania, see N.Y. Times, July 11, 1967, at 1, col. 8. See also
letter to President Johnson by the Educational Committee to Halt Atomic Weapons
Spread, which is headed by Arthur Larson, Director of the Rule of Law Research
Center, Duke University, summarized in N.Y. Times, July 11, 1967, at 14, col. 5;
UNA-USA, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NucEAR WEAxNS (1967) ; Draft Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons submitted by the U.S. and the Soviet
Union at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference on Aug. 24, 1967, text reproduced in id. at 40.
Refusal by Peking to sign the 1963 test ban treaty may be viewed as indicating
that China does not take lightly commitments to international agreements of this

nature. See Leng, supra note 1, at 116.
197 It may be appropriate to recall a recent statement by Secretary of State Rusk:
If there were a mainland China that made it clear it would live in peace with
its neighbors, our presence in Asia, in any special sense, would be irrelevant.
The American people would be content to tend to their own problems and
leave the rest of the world alone. We are basically isolationist in that sense.
Moskin, Our New Western Frontier, Loox, May 30, 1967, at 46. He went on to
predict: "It's going to be useful for some time to come for American power to be
able to control every wave of the Pacific, if necessary." Id.
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The present study will not be complete without an urgent plea
for a redoubled effort towards a systematic study of the Chinese concepts and practice of law, both domestic and international. The present
study has barely scratched the surface of Chinese practice in international law. Peking's concept of what constitutes an intervention in
the domestic affairs of another nation, for example, must be thoroughly
examined in view of the inclusion of a nonintervention clause in many
of its treaties 8 and the recent expulsion of its personnel from several
African states for having allegedly intervened in their domestic affairs.
It may be noted that this subject of nonintervention is more complex
than is immediately apparent, and remains to be codified even after
three sessions of the United Nations Special Committee on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States."0 9
The PRC's role in the Geneva Conventions on Indo-China
and Laos also needs to be analyzed once the dust has settled. A
study of the background and character of recent diplomatic and
consular incidents involving British,"'0 Dutch,"0 1 French 2 2 and
See also Secretary Rusk's statement at a news conference that American national
security is at stake in South Viet-Nam because "within the next decade or two, there
will be a billion Chinese on the mainland, armed with nuclear weapons, with no certainty about what their attitude towards the rest of Asia will be." New York Times,
Oct. 13, 1967, at 14, col. 1.
198 See note 10 supra.
199 At the 1964 Mexico City Conference of the Special Committee, for example,
there were serious differences of opinion on the definition of "intervention." See
SPECIAL COMM. ON PRINCIPLES OF INT'L LAW, REPORT CONCFRNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES, 109-41, U.N. Doc. A/5746 (1964) ; Mc-

Whinney, The "New" Countries and "New" InternationalLaw: The United Nations'
Special Conference on, Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 60 Am.
J.INT'L L. 1, 21 (1966) ; Lee, The Mexico City Conference of the United Nations
Special Committee on Principlesof InternationalLaw and Co-operation among States,
14 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 1304-06 (1965).
Attempts to obtain a consensus at two subsequent sessions of the Special Committee were equally unsuccessful. See SPECIAL. COMM. ON PRINCIPLES OF INT'L LAw,
REPORT CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES 124-60,
U.N. Doc. A/6230 (1966); id. at 135-63, 210, U.N. Doc. A/6799 (1967).
200 Chinese demonstrators in Peking barred D. Hopson, British Chargi d'Affaires,
from leaving for a trip, and in Shanghai manhandled R. Whitney, a first secretary,
and P. Hewitt, a consular officer, whose home was reportedly ransacked. The
demonstrations were inspired by alleged British mistreatment of Chinese workers in
Hong Kong. See N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at 1, col. 5; May 17, 1967, at 1, col. 5;
May 25, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
201The PRC declared G. J. Jongejans, the Netherlands Charg4 d'Affaires in
Peking, persona non grata in retaliation for the Netherlands expulsion of Li En-chiu,
the Chinese Charg6 d'Affaires, as persona non grata. Peking additionally held Jongejans as a hostage for the safe return of eight Chinese technical experts detained in
The Hague in connection with the death of a Chinese engineer. Jongejans and the
Chinese experts were eventually released after almost half a year's detention. See
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, at 6, col. 2; July 20, 1966, at 7, col. 1; July 23, 1966, at 2,
col. 4; Jan. 1, 1967, at 11, col. 1.
202 Robert Richard, Commercial Counsellor of the French Embassy in Peking,
was pulled from his car by demonstrators outside the Embassy and forced to stand
in below-freezing cold for nearly seven hours for having allegedly struck three persons

TREATY RELATIONS OF PRC

Soviet 2 03 personnel may shed valuable insight on Peking's attitude
towards customary international law, since the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations lack binding force vis-A-vis Peking. The same holds
true with respect to the Sino-Indian border conflicts in the absence of
a boundary treaty. Also of interest are the effects, if any, of the
tributary system that existed in the Confucian family of nations upon
the PRC's relations with China's erstwhile vassal states.
Recent anti-Chinese riots and demonstrations in several Asian
countries with attendant loss of Chinese lives and property have led
Peking to make a number of significant pronouncements concerning the
rights of overseas Chinese under international law and practice.2°
Would Peking's concept of State responsibility towards aliens and
their properties hold true when the PRC is the accused instead of the
accuser?"0 ' Would the doctrine of estoppel apply? These are questions pregnant with implications.
Above all, it should be realized that the Western concept of law
is very different from that of China, dichotomized as it has been
between 1i and fa. 0 6 In the event of a conflict, 1i usually prevails over
fa, even in today's mainland China where Mao's "i" is being actively
with his car. He was released after a three-hour interrogation by military police.
Anti-French demonstrations were held in protest against the arrest and alleged maltreatment of Chinese students trying to march on the Soviet Embassy in Paris. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
203For stories of repeated Red Guard demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy
in Peking for alleged brutality inflicted upon Chinese students in Moscow, see N.Y.
Times, Nov. 27, 1966, at 19, col. 1; Jan. 30, 1967, at 3, col. 1; Jan. 31, 1967, at 5, col. 4.
204For Peking's protests to Indonesia on treatment of Chinese, see PEKING
REVIEW, No. 48, at 20-23 (1965) ; id. No. 12, at 5-6 (1966) ; id. No. 16, at 9-10 (1966).
For protests to India, see 9 CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO-UO TuI-wAi KUAN-HSI
CHI, supra note 39, at 127-29, 161-62, 209-10; Chou Ken-shen, The
WFN-cHmi
Prosecution of Chinese Nationals and Infringement upon Their Rights and Interests
by the Indian Government are Serious Violations of International Law, Jen-min
Jih-pao, Jan. 22, 1963. For protests to Burma, see N.Y. Times, July 8, 1967, at 3,
col. 1.
205 During the early 1950's there were many instances of expulsion, detention
or imprisonment of aliens and de facto confiscation of their properties through such
devices as enforced payments of back taxes and employees' severance allowances.
See, e.g., Government Administrative Council, Decree for the Expropriation of the
Asia Petroleum Co. Properties (British), April 30, 1951, in CHUNG-YANG JEN-MIN
(Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Central GovernCHEN-Fu FA-UNG Hul-PIEx
ment) 445 (1951); A. BoNNIcHON, LAW IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1956); U.S. DEI'T
OF STATE, CONDUCT OF COMMUNIST CHINA (printed for use by the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963) ; U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE SERVICE, EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED

PROPERTY By FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16 (prepared for the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 1963).
In the hope that there will be eventual compensation for American claims, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 89-780, 80 Stat. 1365 (Nov. 6, 1966) (An Act to amend
title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. § 1643) to
provide for determination of the amounts of claims of nationals of the U.S. against
the Chinese Communist regime).
206Roughly translated as "customary norms of behavior" and "enacted law,"
respectively. See note 23 supra.
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advanced through the Cultural Revolution to replace the century-old
Confucian Ii. Because of the predominance of li, the study of Chinese
law must be all-embracing. To a much greater extent than is true
of Western law, it must include the study of philosophy, religion,
classics, history, politics, economics, sociology and psychology. Preoccupation with scrutinizing, analyzing and comparing Chinese statutes
and court decisions-a skill which Western lawyers employ with
'
dexterity and felicity-is futile and its results misleading, 07
since, if
devoid of insight into the make-up of Chinese society, such an approach
would at best deal with symptoms and not causes. Yet the mastery
of the Chinese language itself, let alone that of the Chinese culture, is
a life-long process for non-Chinese. Even in this age of automation,
individual painstaking, persevering effort cannot be replaced by instant
scholarship through committees, conferences, computers or research
assistantships. Encouraged though we may be by the efforts of a few
American universities to initiate Chinese legal study and a few law
professors who have begun the study of the Chinese language, the
tasks ahead are arduous and full of pitfalls.
207

See this author's book review of Maung Maung, Law and Clatom in Burma

and the Burnese Family, 12 Am. J. CoMP. L. 606-09 (1963).

